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Abstract
Maude-NPA is a narrowing-based model checker for analysing cryptographic
protocols in the Dolev-Yao model modulo equations. Maude-NPA is a powerful
analyzer that is sound and never returns spurious counter-examples. Maude-
NPA is also very flexible, providing the user great flexibility in designing his/her
own custom notation. Maude-NPA also supports a large variety of equational
theories (any theory possessing the finite variant property, plus dedicated al-
gorithms for homomorphism and exclusive or). However, Maude-NPA relies
on a strand-based notation that, while very precise, is less familiar to users of
the Alice-Bob notation. Furthermore, the input language itself is rather dif-
ficult to read and write. This makes Maude-NPA hard to use, and therefore
a less attractive option for protocol verification despite its power. We pro-
pose a new input language called the Maude Protocol Specification Language
(Maude-PSL). The Maude-PSL extends the Alice-and-Bob notation with the
following additional pieces of information: the interpretation each principal has
for every message he/she sends and receives, the information each principal is
assumed to know at the start of the protocol execution, and the information the
principal should know after execution. The Maude-PSL also provides simple
yet expressive syntax for specifying intruder capabilities, secrecy attacks and
authentication attacks. The Maude-PSL retains the flexible, Maude-like syn-
tax for specifying the operators, type structure, and algebraic properties of a
protocol. The semantics of the language is defined as a rewrite theory that
rewrites Maude-PSL specifications into Maude-NPA strands. This provides a
formal grounding of Maude-PSL specifications in a well understood model of
cryptographic protocols.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the modern day explosion of Internet-based commerce, a means of establish-
ing secure communications between two geographically distant strangers has
become tremendously important. For example, thousands of users across the
globe need to be able to form a secure connection with their banks, so that they
may view their bank account information in the comfort and security of their
own home (amongst other places). However, the nature of the Internet is such
that anyone may be listening in on and interfering with any one of these com-
munications, with neither the user nor the bank the wiser. As a result, over the
past half a century, a tremendous amount of effort has been put into develop-
ing processes for establishing secure communications across insecure channels,
called cryptographic protocols.
Unfortunately, developing secure protocols is a very difficult and subtle pro-
cess. The security of a protocol may hinge on the absence of a single number.
The smallest tweak may make an insecure protocol secure, or give a previously
secure protocol a giant hole. To highlight the difficulty in designing a secure
cryptographic protocol, cautionary tale is that of the Needham-Schroeder public
key protocol [22]. The protocol was developed in 1978, was proven secure, and
was believed to be secure for many years. However, in 1998, twenty years after
the protocol’s introduction, Gavin Lowe found an exploit [18]. Due to the diffi-
culty in proving a protocol secure, and the high stakes involved in ensuring that
a cryptographic protocol is in fact secure, a lot of work has been done on trying
to automate the proofs of security. The idea is that an automated, exhaustive
proof should be able to catch the kind of subtle exploits that humans often fail
to see immediately. As a result, of this research, a variety of tools have been
developed, including but not limited to Maude-NPA[12], AVISPA[29], CPSA[8]
and ProVerif [3]. However, the notation typically used by protocol designers
to discuss cryptographic protocols (called here the Alice and Bob notation) is
not precise enough to perform automated verification. As a result, a major
component of all of these tools has been the development of a domain specific
language for protocol specification.
Cryptographic protocol specification is a tricky balancing act. On the one
hand, the specification must be provided in a formal logic with all the details
needed to perform automatic verification. On the other, it is often difficult
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to debug specifications provided to formal tools, because these tools do not
execute the protocol in the normal sense of the word. As a result, the specifi-
cation needs to be clear enough, and simple enough to ensure that the specifier
provides a correct specification. Furthermore, if the specification language is
either too complex or too different from what protocol analyzers are used to,
the tool will not be used due to the steep learning curve. One tool that ex-
emplifies this exact problem is Maude-NPA. Maude-NPA is a powerful tool for
cryptographic protocol analysis based on symbolic model checking. Maude-NPA
provides the user the ability to define their own syntax, and to verify protocols
modulo a large class of equational theories. Furthermore, Maude-NPA analysis
is sound, and does not produce spurious attacks. However, despite this power
and flexibility, the input language is fairly complex, requires the user to include
a variety of extra syntactic “kibble” that is necessary for the tool to function,
but is semantically meaningless with respect to the protocol. Furthermore, in
Maude-NPA, protocols are formulated based on a mathematical object called
“strands.” While strands are not particularly complicated, they do formulate
protocols from a point of view that protocol designers may not be used to.
Finally, attacks are specified in Maude-NPA using fragments of Maude-NPA
states, which not only exposes internal implementation details to the user, but
also forces code duplication.
Therefore, to improve the usability of Maude-NPA, we present a new input
language called the Maude Protocol Specification Language (Maude-PSL) for
Maude-NPA. Rather than using strands, the Maude-PSL uses an extension of
the Alice and Bob notation. This ensures that information about the destination
and source of each message is preserved. Second, the syntax is made as minimal
as possible. Everything that the user writes has to do with the protocol, the
properties of the operations used by the protocol, and the environment in which
the protocol is being executed. Third, attacks are specified without explicitly
rewriting the protocol, but rather by referencing it. In particular, attacks only
need to be modified if the variables used in the protocol are changed. So long as
those stay constant, attacks are not affected by modifications to the protocol.
The Maude-PSL also introduces additional more stringent static checks that are
meant to capture as many subtle, otherwise hard-to-detect errors as possible.
The Maude-PSL is implemented on top of Maude-NPA by using the original,
strand-based input language as an intermediary language. The translation from
a Maude-PSL specification to the corresponding Maude-NPA specification is
implemented using a combination of Python and Maude. At the Python level,
we decompose the specification into the high level syntax and user-defined terms.
The Python level then performs a variety of checks on the top level syntax. If
the specification passes all of these checks, then Python uses the specification to
generate a term to be rewritten by Maude. This term is then fed into Maude.
Maude then performs certain checks that Python cannot easily handle (such
as the syntactic correctness of user-defined terms). If the specification-derived-
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term passes all of these checks as well, then Maude rewrites the term into a
Maude-NPA specification. Python then writes this specification to a file. From
this point on, the user may load the Maude-NPA specification into Maude-NPA,
and interact with Maude-NPA in the exact same manner as if he/she had written
the specification in Maude-NPA’s original input language. Figure 1 provides a
high-level, visual depiction of the translation process.
Maude-PSL
Specification
Maude Term
Maude-NPA
Specification
Maude
Figure 1.1: An overview of the translation from a Maude-PSL specification to
a Maude-NPA specification.
The Maude-PSL tool can be found at
http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/tools/Maude-NPA/Maude-PSL/.
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Chapter 2
Background
The goal of the Maude-PSL is to provide a user-friendly specification language
for use with Maude-NPA, an order-sorted rewriting-based tool for the verifi-
cation of cryptographic protocols. Therefore, the user of the language must
have some familiarity with order-sorted term rewriting, cryptographic protocol
analysis, and Maude-NPA.
2.1 Rewriting Logic and Maude
2.1.1 Rewrite Theories
Term rewriting is a Turing-complete computational model based on the step-by-
step modification of mathematical entities called terms. A program is modeled
in rewriting logic using a rewrite theory. Maude is a declarative programming
language where programs are (various flavors of) rewrite theories, called mod-
ules [6]. Since the Maude-PSL uses a fragment of Maude as a sub-language, a
basic understanding of both rewriting logic and Maude are imperative to un-
derstanding how to use the Maude-PSL. Therefore, we shall introduce the two
in tandem. We shall explain various flavors of rewriting logic, and write out
example theories in Maude code.
When specifying protocols in the Maude-PSL, we are concerned with equa-
tional theories. Equational theories are pairs (Σ, E), where Σ, called the theory’s
signature consists of a set of symbols called operators, and E , called the theory’s
equations, is a set of equalities between terms. For example, the equational
theory of the natural numbers with addition may consist of a constant 0 rep-
resenting the number zero, an operator s representing the successor (plus one)
function, an operator + representing addition, and the equations
x+ 0 = x (2.1)
0 + x = x (2.2)
s(x) + y = s(x+ y) (2.3)
One can then use these equations to perform equational reasoning (replacing
equals by equals) to prove terms equal modulo the equations. For example, the
terms s(0) + s(0) and s(s(0)) can be proven equal modulo E , written s(0) +
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s(0) =E s(s(0)) as follows: s(0) + s(0) =2.3 s(0 + s(0)) =2.2 s(s(0))
Unfortunately, equational reasoning is difficult to automate. Equations may
be applied either left to right, or right to left, and it may not be obvious which
direction should be applied at any given point. However, if we orient the two-
directional equations into one-directional rules such that the rules are confluent
and terminating (see Section 2.1.5), then we may safely use the one-directional
rules instead of the two-directional equations to automate equational reason-
ing. Equational theories whose equations have been oriented are called rewrite
theories, and are denoted (Σ, R), where R is the set of rules1.
What follows is an exploration of some of the basic concepts in term rewrit-
ing. However, this section provides only the barest of glimpses into the richness
and complexity of rewriting logic, and only covers those concepts needed to use
the Maude-PSL. References to resources that provide a more in-depth treatment
may be found in Section 2.1.6.
Signatures
Every operator f ∈ Σ is associated with a natural number n called the arity of
the operator. Operators with an arity of 0 are called constants. Operators of
arity n are called n-ary. 1-ary and 2-ary operators have special names: unary
and binary respectively.
Terms are defined recursively as follows:
1. If f ∈ Σ is a constant, then f is a term.
2. If t1, . . . tn are terms, and f ∈ Σ is an n-ary operator, then f(t1, . . . , tn) is
a term.
Note that t1, . . . tn in rule 2 are referred to as the arguments of f .
Example 2.1.1. Suppose we have the signature {0, s,+} where 0 is a constant,
s is unary, and + is binary (This signature will be defined in Maude when we
cover many-sorted theories).
The following are terms:
• 0
• s(0), where the argument of s is 0.
• +(s(0), 0), where the arguments of + are s(0) and 0.
• s(+(s(0), 0)), where the argument of s is +(s(0), 0).
The operators in the example above are expressed using prefix syntax, i.e.
the operator appears before its arguments. It is also possible to express opera-
tors using mixfix syntax, in which operator appear interwoven with the opera-
tor’s arguments. For example, we may define the + operator above as + .
1Technically, a rewrite theory is just a signature and a set of rules. The rules do not need
to be derived from an equational theory. However, such rewrite theories are beyond the scope
of this document.
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+s
0
0
Figure 2.1: Tree of the term s(0) + 0
The underscores indicate the position at which arguments should be placed rel-
ative to the operator name. So, we may write the term +(s(0), 0) as s(0) + 0.
However, since each mixfix operator can be trivially turned into a prefix opera-
tor, we will assume all operators are prefix when discussing generic theories.
Terms may also be viewed as trees. Each node is an operator, and the
children of each node are exactly the arguments of the corresponding operator.
The root is the outermost operator, and the leaves are constants. See Figure 2.1
for a tree representation of s(0) + 0. The subtrees of a term tree are called the
subterms of the term.
A position p in a term is a path from the root of the term tree to some node
in the tree. The subterm t′ of term t at position p, denoted tp, is the subterm
rooted at position p in the term tree. The empty position λ is the position of
the root of the entire tree.
We assume that every signature has a countably infinite set X of constants
called variables, disjoint from the rest of the signature. We only consider finite
signatures. Finite signatures are those that can be decomposed into a disjoint
union of a finite set of operators, and a countably infinite set of variables.
Substitutions
A substitution θ is a function from variables to terms. Every substitution may
be uniquely extended to a function θ from terms to terms as follows:
1. θ(a) = a if a is a constant, and a is not in the domain of θ
2. θ(x) = θ(x).
3. θ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(θ(t1), . . . , θ(tn)).
Because the extension is unique, we may refer to both the original substitution
θ and its extension θ as θ without ambiguity. Furthermore, instead of writing
θ(t) for t a term, we write tθ.
A substitution θ is called idempotent if and only if for every term t, tθθ = tθ.
Rules
The rules of a rewrite theory consists of a set of ordered pairs of terms {(u1 →
v1), . . . , (un → vn)}. Computation is performed by using these rules to rewrite
terms into other terms. We assume that for every rule u→ v, vars(v) ⊆ vars(u).
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Given two terms t, t′, we say that t rewrites to t′ with rule u → v ∈ R
at position p with substitution θ, denoted t →p,θ,u→v t′ (t → t′ if the rules,
position and substitution are understood) iff uθ = tp, and vθ = t
′
p. In this case,
we say that u matches t, with matching substitution θ. We denote the transitive
closure by t→+ t′, and the reflexive-transitive closure by t→∗ t′.
A term t is called R-normalized (or just normalized) iff there is no rule
u→ v, no term t′, and no substitution θ such that t→ t′. Usually, computation
in a rewrite theory consists of normalizing some term t, i.e. rewriting t until the
term is R-normalized, and then taking the normalized term(s) as the result(s)
of the computation.
Example 2.1.2. Recall the signature {0, s, + } from Example 2.1.1. Suppose
we also have the following rules:
x+ 0→ x (2.4)
0 + x→ x (2.5)
s(x) + y → s(x+ y) (2.6)
Then, we can rewrite the term s(s(0)) + s(0) to the normalized term
s(s(s(0))) as follows:
s(s(0)) + s(0)→{x7→s(0),y 7→s(0)},λ, 2.6
s(s(0) + s(0))→{x7→0,y 7→s(0)},λ.1, 2.6
s(s(0 + s(0)))→{x7→0,y 7→s(0)},λ.1.1.1, 2.5
s(s(s(0)))
If 0 is treated as the natural number 0, s as the successor (or plus one) function
on natural numbers, and + as natural number addition, then we see that we
have computed the value of the expression 2 + 1!
Now, observe that any term may be used as an argument to any operator.
Since rewriting itself only depends on pattern matching, this may lead to unex-
pected behavior when attempting to model systems (such as programs written
in programming languages with types) that do place restrictions on the types
of computation that may be performed on different types of data.
Example 2.1.3. Consider the theory from Example 2.1.2, plus the additional
operators:{>,⊥, ∧ } where > and ⊥ are constants, while ∧ is binary,
and the rules:
> ∧ z → z (2.7)
z ∧ > → z (2.8)
⊥ ∧ z → ⊥ (2.9)
z ∧ ⊥ → ⊥ (2.10)
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These rules are meant to model the boolean values true and false, while the
rules define ∧ to be the boolean operation and.
However, there is nothing stopping us from considering (and evaluating) the
term (s(0) +>)∧ (>+ 0) to s(>), even though conceptually the successor of >
(or > plus a number for that matter) makes no sense.
In order to get around this problem, one would have to introduce explicit
operators and rules that disallow this kind of mixing. However, this is tedious,
time consuming, and error prone. A more attractive approach is to introduce a
notion of types, called sorts. To distinguish a rewriting theory with sorts from
one without, we refer to a rewrite theory without sorts as an unsorted rewrite
theory.
2.1.2 Many Sorted Rewriting
A many sorted rewriting theory is very much like an unsorted rewriting theory,
except with several extensions to account for the sorts.
First, the signature Σ is now a pair (S, F ), where S is a finite set of sorts,
and F a finite set of operators. Furthermore, each n-ary operator f ∈ F now
has n+ 1 sorts associated with it: s1, s2, . . . sn+1. The first n sorts are the sorts
of the operator’s arguments, while the last sort is the result sort. An n-ary
operator f with sorts s1, . . . , sn+1 is denoted f : s1, . . . sn → sn+1.
We now have a family of countable sets of variables, one for each sort:⋃
s∈S Xs.
Next, each term has associated with it at least one sort. We use t : s to
denote that t is of sort s. This sort is defined as part of the recursive definition
of terms:
1. Every constant a :→ s is a term of sort s
2. Let f : s1 . . . sn → sn+1 be an n-ary operator, and t1, . . . tn be terms.
Then, f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term of sort sn+1 iff ti : si for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A substitution θ is valid only if it preserves the sorts. In other words, it
must be the case that for every x in the domain of θ, x : s iff xθ : s.
Example 2.1.4. Recall the theory from Example 2.1.3. Now, we shall write
that theory as a many-sorted theory in Maude.
mod NAT -BOOL is
sorts Nat Bool .
op 0 : -> Nat .
op s : Nat -> Nat .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat .
op True : -> Bool .
op False : -> Bool .
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op _/\_ : Bool Bool -> Bool .
vars X Y : Nat .
var Z : Bool .
eq 0 + X = X .
eq X + 0 = X .
eq s(X) + Y = s(X + Y) .
eq Z /\ True = Z .
eq True /\ Z = Z .
eq Z /\ False = False .
eq False /\ Z = False .
endm
The keywords op, var(s), and eq stand for “operator,” “variable(s),” and
“equation” respectively, while /\ is an ASCII approximation of the boolean and
operator “∧.” The keywords mod and endm are used to begin and end a module
of name NAT-BOOL. Despite the name, equations are in fact oriented from left to
right as rules. By declaring rules to be equations, the programmer is claiming
that the rules so defined are confluent and terminating (see Section 2.1.5 for
more details).
Now, s(0) + True) /\ (True + 0) is not a valid Σ-term, because the _+_
operator is only defined on pairs of terms of sort Nat . In other words, the above
specification preserves the intuitive separation between natural numbers and
booleans.
While a many-sorted theory allows us to naturally enforce the separation
between different data types, it does not provide an easy means of encoding
subtypes. For example, the fact that natural numbers are also integers, or the
fact that encrypted and unencrypted messages are both still messages.
Example 2.1.5. Suppose we would like a theory that makes a distinction be-
tween integers and natural numbers, but still has them behave the same on
shared data. In other words, we would like the natural numbers to be a subtype
of integers. Our first attempt may look something like this:
mod NATS -INTS
sorts Nat Int .
op 0N : -> Nat .
op s : Nat -> Nat .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat .
op 0I : -> Int .
op s : Int -> Int .
op p : Int -> Int .
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op _+_ : Int Int -> Int .
vars X1 X2 : Nat .
vars Y1 Y2 : Int .
eq X1 + 0N = X1 .
eq 0N + X1 = X1 .
eq s(X1) + X2 = s(X1 + X2) .
eq Y1 + 0I = Y1 .
eq 0I + Y1 = Y1 .
eq s(Y1) + Y2 = s(Y1 + Y2) .
eq p(Y1) + Y2 = p(Y1 + Y2) .
eq s(p(Y1)) = Y1 .
eq p(s(Y1)) = Y1 .
endm
where the p operator, or predecessor can be thought of as the inverse of the s or
successor operation (i.e. p represents “minus one” as opposed to “plus one”).
Obviously, there is a lot to be desired here. First, unless we are willing to
tolerate an ambiguous signature (i.e. allow the term s(0) to have two parses:
one as a Nat, the other as an Int) we do not actually have any overlap between
natural numbers and integers. Second, there is a lot of repetition, both of
operators and rules. If we would like to mix integers and naturals, then we
would have even more rules. Finally, if we wish to transition between natural
numbers and integers, we need to introduce an explicit function to perform that
conversion.
There are smarter approaches to modeling subtyping in many-sorted theo-
ries. We can use predicates to model subtypes in much the same way that we
can simulate sorts in an unsorted theory. However, doing this manually is again
tedious, error prone, and can clutter up the theory with bookkeeping that we
would rather not deal with. Therefore, it would be nice if we had some notion
of subtypes built into the logic.
2.1.3 Order-Sorted Rewriting
In order-sorted rewriting, we extend many sorted rewriting with a notion of sub-
sorts. The signature of an order-sorted rewrite theory is now a pair ((S,<), F ),
where S and F are as described in Section 2.1.2, and < is a partial order on
sorts. The partial order has a simple meaning: the sort s1 is a subsort of s2,
written s1 < s2 if and only if for every Σ-term t of sort s1, t is also of sort s2.
In other words, the set of all terms of sort s1 is a subset of the set of all terms
of sort s2.
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Example 2.1.6. The following is the order-sorted equivalent of the theory from
Example 2.1.5
sorts Nat Int .
subsort Nat < Int .
op 0 : -> Nat .
op s : Nat -> Nat .
op s : Int -> Int .
op p : Int -> Int .
op _+_ : Int Int -> Int .
vars X Y : Int .
eq s(p(X)) = X .
eq p(s(X)) = X .
eq X + 0 = X .
eq 0 + X = X .
eq s(X) + Y = s(X + Y) .
eq p(X) + Y = p(X + Y) .
Since natural numbers are also integers, the equations apply to natural numbers
as well as integers, so we may evaluate s(0) + s(0) to s(s(0)), p(0) + p(0)
to p(p(0)), and s(0) + p(0) to 0 using the same equations for addition.
2.1.4 Rewriting Modulo Axioms
While orienting equations into rules provides an intuitive and general means for
automating equational reasoning, some equations, such as commutativity and
associativity, do not lend themselves well to orientation.
Example 2.1.7. Suppose we would like to explicitly make addition associative
and commutative. Our first instinct would be to define the following module.
mod NAT is
sorts Nat .
op 0 : -> Nat .
op s : Nat -> Nat .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat .
vars X Y Z : NAT .
eq X + Y = Y + X .
eq (X + Y) + Z = X + (Y + Z) .
eq 0 + X = X .
eq s(X) + Y = s(X + Y) .
endm
11
There are two problems with this. First, every term of the form X + Y will
have an infinite rewrite sequence X + Y → Y + X → X + Y → . . ., because
we can always map X to Y and Y to X. This is clearly not desirable. Second,
the associativity equation does not give us true associativity. The associativity
equation groups all elements of the additions except the first into one term. As
a result, we are essentially forced to treat a sequence of multiple additions as
a poor man’s dequeue: we can add additions to the front and back, but can
only access the first number in the addition in the pattern of a rule. However,
associativity is supposed to allow us to freely group elements within the addition,
allowing us to isolate arbitrary elements in the middle. So for the term s(0) +
s(0) + 0 + 0 + 0 we should be able to work with any of s(0) + (s(0) + 0 + 0 + 0),
(s(0) + s(0)) + 0 + (0 + 0), (s(0) + s(0) + 0 + 0) + 0 and so on.
To get around this, we can split our rules into a disjoint union: B unionmulti R.
B is a set of equations, called axioms that we do not try to orient. Instead
we use a different method to reason about the equality of terms modulo B
(typically an algorithm designed explicitly for the equations in B). Furthermore,
we will now apply the rules in R modulo B. We define the relation →R/B to
be =B ;→R; =B where ; is relation composition in diagrammatic order, and we
perform all rewriting as t→R/B t′. A rewrite theory modulo axioms is written
as a triple (Σ, B,R) where Σ is the signature of the theory, B is the set of
axioms, and R the set of rewrite rules.
Example 2.1.8. Maude supports associativity, commutativity, and unit (ACU)
as axioms (among others, however Maude-NPA only supports commutativity,
associativity, and unit). So in order to make addition commutative and asso-
ciative, we add the following operator attributes:
fmod NAT is
sorts Nat .
op 0 : -> Nat .
op s : Nat -> Nat .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat [assoc comm] .
vars X Y : Nat .
eq 0 + X = X .
eq s(X) + Y = s(X + Y) .
endfm
Note the assoc (associativity) and comm (commutativity) between brackets at
the end of the _+_ operator. Furthermore, observe that we have removed the
equation X + 0 = X . This is because the comm attribute makes this equation
unnecessary. Now, if we have the term X + 0, Maude will rewrite it as follows:
X + 0 ={comm,assoc} 0 +X →R X ={comm,assoc} X.
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We can also eliminate the equation X + 0 = X by introducing the identity
axiom:
fmod NAT is
sort Nat .
op 0 : -> Nat .
op s : Nat -> Nat .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat [assoc comm id: 0] .
vars X Y : Nat .
eq s(X) + Y = s(X + Y) .
endfm
Now, the equation eq 0 + X = X . is not necessary, because s(0) + s(0) →R
s(0 + s(0)) =id: 0 s(s(0)). However, the identity attribute is a little bit danger-
ous, because it allows Maude to not only remove an identity from a term, but
also to add an identity to a term. Therefore, if the user is not careful, he/she
can very easily make Maude loop. For example, suppose we try to reduce the
term s(0) in the module above. Intuitively, we would expect the result to be
s(0). However, Maude will in fact loop on the following sequence:
s(0) =ACU s(0) + 0→ s(0 + 0) =ACU s(0)
It is possible to avoid this problem through a careful application of sorts.
For example, consider the following module.
fmod NAT is
sorts Zero Nat NzNat .
subsorts Zero NzNat < Nat .
op 0 : -> Zero .
op s : Nat -> NzNat .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat
[assoc comm id: 0] .
vars X : Nat .
var Y : NzNat .
eq s(X) + Y = s(X + Y) .
endfm
Here, because 0 is not of sort NzNat , the equation s(X) + Y = s(X + Y )
does not apply to the term s(0) + 0. Therefore, s(0) =ACU s(0) + 0 =ACU s(0)
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with no intermediate rewrite step possible.
However, implementing this fix is predicated on the knowledge that there
is a problem in the first place. Since Maude-NPA is attempting to solve an
undecidable problem, there is no guarantee that Maude-NPA will terminate.
Therefore, a failure of Maude-NPA to terminate in a reasonable timespan says
nothing about the correctness of the specification. So in the interest of mini-
mizing the chance of error, the identity attribute is strongly discouraged.
Technically Maude does not perform →R/B rewriting because →R/B is un-
decidable in general. Instead, Maude performs the (in general) weaker rewriting
relation →R,B [15]. Although the →R,B relation is in general weaker, there is
a class of rewrite theories for which →R,B and →R/B are equivalent in power
with respect to computing normal forms. These theories are called coherent
modulo the axioms. Decision procedures exist for making well-formed equa-
tional theories coherent modulo C, AC, and ACU [25]. Maude-PSL leverages
previous implementations of these procedures in Maude to automatically make
all user-provided theories coherent. Therefore an understanding of the distinc-
tion between→R/B and→R,B is not necessary to correctly use the Maude-PSL.
Therefore, since coherence is rather subtle, its discussion is omitted. The inter-
ested reader may wish to look at Jouannaud, Kirchner, and Kirchner’s work on
coherence [15], or Meseguer’s overview of rewriting logic [19] for more details
about coherence.
2.1.5 Confluence, Termination, and Least Sorted
One of the greatest strengths of Maude-NPA is the ability to reason about cryp-
tographic protocols modulo an equational theory. Therefore, one of the purposes
of the Maude-PSL is to allow us easily specify which equational theory we would
like to reason modulo. We do this by defining an order-sorted rewrite theory,
very similar to the modules in Example 2.1.8. However, in order to ensure that
our order-sorted rewrite theory correctly models the desired equational theory,
the rewrite theory must have two properties: termination, and confluence.
Termination
A rewrite theory is terminating if for every term t, there is no infinite rewrite
sequence t → t1 → . . . → ti → . . .. In other words, every rewrite sequence
starting at t is of the form t→ t1 → . . .→ tn, for some n ∈ N, and tn in normal
form.
Confluence
A rewrite theory is confluent if for any term t, we have that t →∗R/B t1 and
t→∗R/B t2, implies that there exists a term t′ such that t1 →∗R/B t′ and t2 →∗R/B
t′. If the theory is terminating, then a rewrite theory is confluent if and only if
14
every term t has a unique normal form, called the canonical form of t, denoted
t ↓R/B , or just t ↓ if R and B are understood. We write t →!R/B t′ to indicate
that t is being rewritten to canonical form t′.
In other words, if a theory is confluent and terminating, then the theory’s
only nondeterminism is “don’t care nondeterminism:” we will always (eventu-
ally) the same result, namely t ↓, regardless of the order in which we apply our
rules.
It should be noted that if the axioms B are non-empty, then we care only
about termination and confluence modulo B.
Example 2.1.9. Consider a theory of sets of natural numbers:
mod NAT -SET is
sorts Nat Set .
subsort Nat < Set .
op 0 : -> Nat .
op s : Nat -> Nat .
op mt : -> Set .
op _,_ : Set Set -> Set [assoc comm]
var S : Set .
eq S, S = S .
endm
Then, the set 0, 0, s(0) →!R/B 0, s(0). Observe that one can rewrite 0, s(0) as
s(0), 0. However, because both terms are equal modulo the axioms, they may
be treated as “one” term, of which 0, s(0) is simply a representative.
Confluence and termination gives us the following key property, called the
Church-Rosser property. Let (Σ, E) be an equational theory, and (Σ, B,R) be an
order-sorted rewrite theory obtained from E by orienting some equations into R
and treating the rest as axioms. Then, if (Σ, B,R) is confluent and terminating
modulo B, then for any two terms t, t′, t =E t′ iff t ↓R/B=B t′ ↓R/B . In other
words, equality may be determined by blindly rewriting both terms to canonical
form, and then comparing the two canonical forms for equality modulo B.
2.1.6 Rewriting Resources
For additional information about (unsorted) rewriting, see the book
Term Rewriting and All That by Franz Baader and Tobias Nipkow [2] or Ad-
vanced Topics in Term Rewriting by Enno Ohlebusch [23]. For details on order-
sorted rewriting with axioms, see the survey paper Twenty Years of Rewriting
Logic by Jose´ Meseguer [19].
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The Maude Manual by Manuel Clavel, et. al. contains additional informa-
tion about Maude [6]. A copy of the Maude Manual may be found on the Maude
website: http://maude.cs.illinois.edu.
2.2 Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
The entire purpose of the Maude-PSL is to specify cryptographic protocols,
which are then verified by Maude-NPA. Therefore, this section is meant to
provide the reader with a brief introduction to the concepts in cryptography
that he/she will need to use and understand the Maude-PSL.
2.2.1 Basic Concepts in Cryptography
Terminology
First, we need to introduce some basic terminology.
• plain/ciphertext - Plaintext is an unencrypted message that can be un-
derstood as-is. Ciphertext, is an encrypted message, which appears to be
meaningless until decrypted.
• symmetric key - An unguessable object used by the encryption and de-
cryption operations to generate the ciphertext (resp. plaintext) from the
plaintext (resp. ciphertext).
• principal - An entity (such as a person, computer, or server) that is capable
of sending messages over a network.
• protocol - A sequence of message passes between two or more principals.
• nonce - A value guaranteed to be unique, and unguessable (typically a
sufficiently large random number). Nonces are typically used to give a
message a watermark unique to the protocol execution for which the mes-
sage was generated. This ensures that an intruder cannot blindly use a
message acquired in a previous session as part of an attack on a future
session (called a replay attack).
• asymmetric key - A pair of keys p, s with the property that any message
encrypted with p can be decrypted only with s, and vice versa. However p
(resp. s) cannot decrypt anything encrypted with p (resp. s), unlike with
symmetric keys. Typically, one key is made publicly available (p), and the
other (s) is kept secret. Then, anyone who wishes to securely send the
owner of s a message encrypts the message with p. If the owner of p and
s wishes to sign a message, he/she encrypts the message with s.
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Alice and Bob
Next, we introduce one of the most popular notations for providing a loose
specification of protocols: the Alice and Bob notation. In the Alice and Bob
notation, a protocol is specified as a numbered sequence of message passes of
the form
1. A→ B : M1
2. B → A : M2
3. A→ S : M3
...
where each of A, B, and S represent three different principals (typically referred
to as “Alice,” “Bob,” and “the Server” respectively), and each Mi is a message.
Each line A→ B : M1 says that Alice is sending the message M1 to Bob.
Example 2.2.1. Consider the Needham-Schroeder public key authentication
protocol, spelled out below [22]. Note that as originally presented, this protocol
included steps in which Alice and Bob each interact with a third party server
to obtain the other’s public key. To simplify the protocol, we are going to leave
out the interactions with the server, and assume that Alice and Bob already
know the other’s public key.
A represents the principal Alice, and B represents the principal Bob. M1;M2
is the concatenation of messages M1 and M2. e(K1,M1) is the encryption of
message M1 with key K1. PKA (resp. PKB) is the public key of A (resp. B).
SKA and SKB are the associated secret keys. NA is a nonce generated by A,
and NB is a nonce generated by B.
1.A→ B : e(PKB , A;NA)
2.B → A : e(PKA, NA;NB)
3.A→ B : e(PKB , NB))
2.2.2 Cryptographic Protocols
The entire purpose of the Maude-PSL is to specify cryptographic protocols,
which are then verified by Maude-NPA. A cryptographic protocol is a protocol
that make certain security guarantees about the data sent and the principals
involved. Typically, these protocols attempt to make two guarantees: the au-
thenticity of the principals, and the secrecy of one or more terms sent during
the protocol. If Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, then the first step is
to make sure she is actually communicating with Bob, and not some unknown
entity pretending to be Bob. Similarly, if Bob receives a message from Alice,
he wants to make sure that he actually received a message from Alice, and not
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a pretender. Therefore, suppose a protocol claims to successfully complete if
and only if all principals involved are who they claim they are. Then we say
that the protocol authenticates the principals. The protocol from Example 2.2.1
provides an example of an authentication protocol, i.e. a cryptographic protocol
whose purpose is to authenticate the participants with each other.
Once Alice has confirmed that she is speaking with Bob, she usually wishes
to send him sensitive information (perhaps a key for a different, more efficient
encryption/decryption algorithm, or a meeting place). Then, she may encrypt
the message with Bob’s public key, or a symmetric key known only by the two
of them, and send the message to Bob. A protocol guarantees the secrecy of
a given message if and only if it is impossible for the intruder to obtain the
message in plaintext.
When studying cryptographic protocols, we typically assume two things:
perfect encryption, and that the intruder has complete control over the network.
Perfect encryption says that the only way to decrypt an encrypted message
is with the appropriate key. Giving the intruder complete control over the
network, allows the intruder to receive every message sent, to send any message
he/she can build to anyone on the network, and to destroy messages. The
intruder is also capable of initiating separate protocol sessions with any other
principal. This is called the Dolev-Yao model of the intruder [9]. The Dolev-
Yao model allows us to focus solely on the protocol, and see if the guarantees
it makes hold even under the most hostile environment imaginable. Attacks
usually consist of the attacker either executing additional protocol sessions with
the honest principals, or intercepting and replacing messages in such a way
that the principals accidentally give the intruder access to secret information,
or give the intruder the information he/she needs to impersonate one or more
principals.
Example 2.2.2. Recall the Needham-Schroeder protocol from Example 2.2.1.
Needham and Schroeder published the protocol in 1978. In 1995, Gavin Lowe
found an attack that allows the intruder to impersonate A (in other words, a
violation of the very authentication guarantee that the original protocol was
designed to provide) [17]. The attack requires two sessions. In session 1, A
initiates a valid session with I. In session 2, I begins a session with B in which
I impersonates A. Following the convention from the original paper that reveals
the attack, we write I(A) to represent the intruder, and we use x.y to indicate
the sending of message y in session x. So 1.1 represents the sending of the first
message in the first session.
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The attack is as follows:
1.1 A→ I : (PK I , A;NA)
2.1 I(A)→ B : e(PK I , A;NA)
2.2 B → I(A) : e(PKA, NA;NB)
1.2 I → A : e(PKA, NA;NB)
1.3 A→ I : e(PK I , NB)
2.3 I(A)→ B : e(PKB , NB)
In other words, the Intruder manages to successfully execute the protocol
with B by passing the messages he/she receives from A in session 1 to B in
session 2, and passing the messages he/she receives from B in session 2 to A
in session 1. Note that the Intruder manages to accomplish this without ever
learning the secret keys of A or B, or trying to break the encryption. Instead,
A does all the work of authenticating the Intruder’s identity as A to B. The
fact that it took not quite two decades to find this attack is a testament to the
difficulty in designing secure protocols and in verifying their security.
2.2.3 Protocol Strands
Due to the difficulty in proving cryptographic protocols secure, a lot of work
has gone into developing tools that leverage ideas in formal methods (model
checking, automated theorem proving, etc.) to prove cryptographic protocols
(in)correct. However, in order to formally analyze a cryptographic protocol, we
first need a mathematical model of cryptographic protocols. Two of the most
popular such models are the pi-calculus [21] (and various derivatives, such as
the spi-calculus [1]), and the strand space model [14]. Since Maude-NPA uses
strand spaces, we will focus exclusively on strands here.
Strand spaces model protocols by associating with each principal a strand.
A strand is a sequence of signed messages (terms) ±m1,±m2, . . . ,±mn that the
associated principal sends and receives. A positive term +m is a term that the
owner of the strand sends, while a minus term −m is a term that the owner
of the strand receives. A strand is denoted A : [±m1,±m2, . . . ,±mn] where A
is the principal who owns the strand, and each ±mi represents either +mi or
−mi depending on whether A sends or receives mi as a part of the protocol.
Example 2.2.3. Recall the Needham-Schroeder protocol from Example 2.2.1:
1. A→ B : e(PKB , A;NA)
2. B → A : e(PKA, NA;NB)
3. A→ B : e(PKB , NB)
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Then, the strand space that models this protocol is:
A : [+(e(PKB , A;NA)),−(e(PKA, NA;NB)),+(e(PKB , NB))]
B : [−(e(PKB , A;NA)),+(e(PKA, NA;NB)),−(e(PKB , NB))]
It should be noted that the strand space model has no notion of time. As
a result, it cannot naturally track the state of a partial execution. Therefore,
Maude-NPA augments the strands with a vertical bar “|” that separates past
messages from future messages [12].
Example 2.2.4. Recall the strand space from Example 2.2.3. Before the pro-
tocol begins executing, our augmented strands are the following:
A : [nil |+ (e(PKB , A;NA)),−(e(PKA, NA;NB)),+(e(PKB , NB))]
B : [nil | − (e(PKB , A;NA)),+(e(PKA, NA;NB)),−(e(PKB , NB))]
Note that nil represents an empty list of signed terms.
Now suppose Alice has sent +(e(PKB , A;NA)), and Bob has received it.
Furthermore, Bob has sent e(PKA, NA;NB), but Alice has not yet received it.
Then our strands would be the following:
A : [+(e(PKB , A;NA))| − (e(PKA, NA;NB)),+(e(PKB , NB))]
B : [nil | − (e(PKB , A;NA)),+(e(PKA, NA;NB))| − (e(PKB , NB))]
Note that bar after the first term in Alice’s strand, and after the second in Bob’s
strand.
2.2.4 Maude-NPA
Maude-NPA is a tool for cryptographic protocol verification using the strand
space model [12]. It is built in Maude, and its specifications are written using
Maude. A specification consists of three modules:
• PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS
• PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-ALGEBRAIC
• PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION.
PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-ALGEBRAIC defines the signature, Σ and the ax-
ioms B.PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-ALGEBRAIC defines the equations (i.e. al-
gebraic properties) of the operators defined in PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-
SYMBOLS. In PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION we define at least three equa-
tions:
• STRANDS-DOLEVYAO
• STRANDS-PROTOCOL
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• Some number of ATTACK-STATE(N) for N a natural number.
STRANDS-DOLEVYAO defines the capabilities of the intruder (while the
Dolev-Yao model says that the intruder can do anything that honest principals
can do, precisely what “anything an honest principal can do” actually is will
often vary from specification to specification). STRANDS-PROTOCOL defines
the strands of the honest principals, while ATTACK-STATE(N) allows us to
specify an attack we would like to prove our protocol (in)secure against.
Example 2.2.5. The following is a Maude-NPA specification of the NS protocol
from Example 2.2.1 using the strands from Example 2.2.3. Three dashes (---)
represents comments. The operators pk and sk are used to represent encryption
with a role’s public and secret key respectively. The modules DEFINITION-
PROTOCOL-RULES and DEFINITION-CONSTRAINTS-INPUT are part of
the implemenation of Maude-NPA, and provide the built-in sorts Msg, Fresh,
and Public amongst other things.
fmod PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -SYMBOLS is
protecting DEFINITION -PROTOCOL -RULES .
sorts Name Nonce Key .
subsort Name Nonce Key < Msg .
subsort Name < Key .
subsort Name < Public .
op pk : Key Msg -> Msg [frozen] .
op sk : Key Msg -> Msg [frozen] .
op n : Name Fresh -> Nonce [frozen] .
op a : -> Name . --- Alice
op b : -> Name . --- Bob
op i : -> Name . --- Intruder
op _;_ : Msg Msg -> Msg
[gather (e E) frozen] .
endfm
fmod PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -ALGEBRAIC is
protecting PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -SYMBOLS .
var X : Name . var Z : Msg .
eq pk(X, sk(X, Z)) = Z [variant] .
eq sk(X, pk(X, Z)) = Z [variant] .
endfm
fmod PROTOCOL -SPECIFICATION is
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protecting PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -SYMBOLS .
protecting DEFINITION -PROTOCOL -RULES .
protecting DEFINITION -CONSTRAINTS -INPUT .
var Ke : Key .
vars X Y Z : Msg .
vars r r’ : Fresh .
vars A B : Name .
vars N N’ N1 N2 : Nonce .
eq STRANDS -DOLEVYAO
= :: nil :: [ nil | -(X), -(Y), +(X ; Y),
nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X ; Y), +(X),
nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X ; Y), +(Y),
nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X), +(sk(i,X)),
nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | -(X), +(pk(Ke ,X)),
nil ] &
:: nil :: [ nil | +(A), nil ]
[nonexec] .
eq STRANDS -PROTOCOL
=
---Alice
:: r ::
[ nil | +(pk(B,A ; n(A,r))),
-(pk(A,n(A,r) ; N)), +(pk(B, N)),
nil ] &
---Bob
:: r’ ::
[ nil | -(pk(B,A ; N’)),
+(pk(A, N’ ; n(B,r’))),
-(pk(B, n(B,r’))), nil ]
[nonexec] .
var S : StrandSet . var K : IntruderKnowledge .
eq ATTACK -STATE (0)
= :: r ::
[ nil , -(pk(b,a ; N)), +(pk(a, N ; n(b,r))),
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-(pk(b,n(b,r))) | nil ]
|| n(b,r) inI , empty
|| nil
|| nil
|| nil
[nonexec] .
eq ATTACK -STATE (1)
= :: r ::
[ nil , -(pk(b,a ; N)), +(pk(a, N ; n(b,r))),
-(pk(b,n(b,r))) | nil ]
|| empty
|| nil
|| nil
|| never
(:: r’ ::
[ nil , +(pk(b,a ; N)), -(pk(a, N ; n(b,r)))
| +(pk(b,n(b,r))), nil ]
& S
|| K)
[nonexec] .
The sort Fresh is an implementation detail. Variables of sort Fresh are used
to enforce the uniqueness of entities like nonces or timestamps. Therefore, by
defining an operator with an argument of sort Fresh (i.e. n : Name Fresh ->
Nonce) we are saying that said operator will be unique across sessions. In order
to properly enforce this guarantee, the strands must explicitly track all fresh
variables generated by that strand. A fresh variable is generated by a strand if
the fresh variable first appears inside of a sent (i.e. positive) term. The variables
generated by a strand are specified between the double colons at the beginning
of each strand. So Alice’s strand generates the fresh variable r.
Intruder capabilities are also modeled as strands. However each intruder
strand must follow the following structure: A list of zero or more received (i.e.
negative) messages followed by a single sent (positive) message. An intruder
strand :: nil :: [−m1,−m2, . . . ,−mn,+m] says that if the intruder knows (i.e.
intercepted) the terms m1,m2, . . . ,mn, then the intruder can learn the term m
(i.e. send the term to himself/herself). For example, the strand :: nil :: [nil| −
(X),−(Y ),+(X;Y ), nil] says that the intruder can concatenate any messages
he/she knows to obtain a new message.
Maude-NPA verifies cryptographic protocols by performing a form of state
space exploration. Therefore, attacks are defined as states that should be un-
reachable during protocol execution. Each fragment of the state is separated by
double bars ||. First, we specify one or more strands in some stage of execution
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(usually fully executed). This tells us which principal(s) is expected to have ex-
ecuted the protocol. Then, we specify a list of terms in the intruder knowledge.
The next two state fragments (both containing nil) are implementation details.
They are only used when debugging Maude-NPA (but not when debugging the
specification). The final stage fragment is called a never pattern. Never pat-
terns are themselves state patterns that may not appear in a valid path from
the start state to the attack state.
For example, attack 0 asks whether it is possible for Bob to execute the
protocol successfully, and for the intruder to learn Bob’s nonce. Meanwhile,
attack 1 asks whether it is possible for Bob to successfully execute the protocol
without Alice successfully executing the protocol. In other words, is it possible
for the intruder to impersonate Alice.
Finally, observe that the strands for Alice and Bob are not exactly what
one would expect. A straight translation of the NS protocol into strands would
suggest the following two strands:
---Alice
:: r ::
[ nil | +(pk(B,A ; n(A,r))),
-(pk(A,n(A,r) ; n(B, r’))),
+(pk(B, n(B, r’))), nil ] &
---Bob
:: r’ ::
[ nil | -(pk(B,A ; n(A, r))),
+(pk(A, n(A, r) ; n(B,r’))),
-(pk(B, n(B,r’))), nil ]
However, instead the specification has the following two strands:
---Alice
:: r ::
[ nil | +(pk(B,A ; n(A,r))),
-(pk(A,n(A,r) ; N)),
+(pk(B, N)), nil ] &
---Bob
:: r’ ::
[ nil | -(pk(B,A ; N’)),
+(pk(A, N’ ; n(B,r’))),
-(pk(B,n(B,r’))), nil ]
Observe that Bob’s nonce is represented as the variable N in Alice’s strand, and
N’ is used to represent Alice’s nonce in Bob’s strand. This is because Maude-
NPA makes use of an idea called perspective [12]. Perspective will be explored
in greater detail in Chapter 3.2.3, however the basic idea is that each principal
can only derive a limited amount of information from the messages they receive.
For example, Alice expects to receive a nonce from Bob, but she has no way
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of knowing for certain that the nonce she received was in fact generated by
Bob (proving this is the whole purpose of the protocol). Maude-NPA requires
the user to make these holes in each principal’s knowledge explicit by replacing
unknown terms with variables of the appropriate sort (or of sort Msg if it is
assumed the principals cannot even type check a message).
In short, Maude-NPA is a tool that uses the strand-space model to model
cryptographic protocols. The strand space model relies on specifying each prin-
cipal’s actions as a strand: a sequence of sent and received messages. Maude-
NPA is implemented in Maude, a declarative language based on order-sorted
rewriting with axioms, which is a model of computation based on one-way equa-
tional reasoning with subtyping.
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Chapter 3
Language Description
A Maude-PSL specification consists of four sections. Each section contains a
sequence of statements, with each statement terminated by a space and pe-
riod. The four sections are: Theory, Protocol, Intruder, and Attacks. Theory
defines the equational theory, Protocol specifies the protocol, Intruder contains
the intruder capabilities, and Attacks contains the types of attacks (e.g. au-
thentication, secrecy violations) to check for.
We will explain the language using a specification of the Diffie-Helman(DH)
protocol as a running example [7].
Example 3.0.6. The top level of the specification is as follows:
spec DH is
Theory
...
Protocol
...
Intruder
...
Attacks
...
ends
Variables must be declared within a section. Variables inside of the Theory
and Intruder sections only have scope within their respective sections. Variable
declarations are not allowed in the Attack section. Instead, the Attack section
relies on the variables declared in the Protocol section. This is because the
attacks depend upon the variables used in the protocol specification. Therefore,
attacks should only use variables that appear in the protocol.
Example 3.0.7. In the following two statements, we declare two variables
AName and BName of sort Name, and one variable M of sort Msg.
vars AName BName : Name .
vars N M : Msg .
Observe the use of the keyword vars when declaring multiple variables of the
same sort, and var when declaring a single variable.
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Variable names must be single identifiers.
With the exception of the protocol section, variable meanings are not pre-
served between statements. For example, the following two equations (equations
are explained in more detail in Section 3.1):
eq pk(AName , sk(AName , M)) = M .
eq sk(AName , pk(AName , M)) = M .
are equivalent to the following two equations:
eq pk(AName , sk(AName , M)) = M .
eq sk(BName , pk(BName , N)) = N .
Note the use of BName instead of AName, and N instead of M in the fourth equation.
The section headers (Theory, Protocol, Intruder and Attacks) do not end
in a space and period. Each specification is begun with the keyword spec and
terminated with the ends keyword. DH is the name chosen for the Diffie-Helman
specification.
We will now look at each section in turn.
3.1 Theory
In this section, we define the algebraic theory of the cryptographic protocol.
The theory is a Maude functional module (for details, see [6]) with a few small
additions, and some restrictions on user-defined operators. We will only focus
on those aspects of Maude functional modules that are important to algebraic
theories typically used in cryptographic protocols.
A theory is meant to define two things: The “language” in which the specifi-
cation will be written, and the properties of the operations (e.g. the commuta-
tivity of XOR) that the protocol depends upon. The language is defined using
a user-defined sort structure and set of operator symbols. The properties are
defined using equations and operator attributes.
3.1.1 Type Structure
The type structure is used to model the capabilities of each principal to perform
type-checking. A richer or poorer type structure may be used to model stronger
or weaker type checking capabilities, respectively.
There are three built-in sorts: Msg, Public, and Fresh, with Public a sub-
sort of Msg. Msg represents the set of all messages that may be sent during
protocol execution. Public represents those messages that are publicly known
(e.g. public keys). Fresh is a special sort that is used to help model session-
specific values like nonces and timestamps (see Page 21).
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Sorts are defined using one of the sort, sorts, type, or types keywords1,
followed by the name(s) of the new sort(s). Sort names are single identifiers.
Multiple sorts may be declared in a single line by separating their names with
whitespace.
Example 3.1.1. The following statement declares the types used by our spec-
ification of DH:
types Name Nonce MultipliedNonces
Generator Exp Key GeneratorOrExp
Secret .
Name represents the set of all principal names. Nonce is obvious. We will be
using nonces to represent the secret exponents used by DH to construct the
symmetric key. MultipliedNonces represents the exponents that have been
multiplied together as part of building the shared key. A Generator is the
public base used for generating keys. An Exp is a generator (or a generator
raised to one or more exponents) raised to one or more exponents. Terms of
sort Secret represent the data that Alice and Bob wish to share securely.
Subsort relations are defined using one of the following keywords: subtype,
subtypes, subsort, or subsorts.
Example 3.1.2. The following is the subtyping structure for DH.
subtypes Generator Exp < GeneratorOrExp .
subtype Exp < Key .
subtypes Name Generator < Public .
subtype Nonce < MultipliedNonces .
So every Generator, and every Exp is a GeneratorOrExp. Meanwhile, an Exp is
treated as a key. All names and all generators are publicly known. Furthermore
a single Nonce is viewed as a degenerate set of MultipliedNonces.
The Maude-PSL automatically makes all user-defined sorts subsorts of Msg.
3.1.2 Operators
In order to specify a protocol, we first need to define a language for the op-
erations (e.g. exponentiation, encryption, and decryption) performed during
protocol execution.
The language of the protocol is defined by declaring operators. These oper-
ators are then used to build terms, which provide a symbolic representation of
the actions performed. For example, the term e(K, M) may be used to represent
a message M encrypted with the key K.
1We consider the notion of type and sort to be the same; therefore, the keyword type,
(resp types) is equivalent to the keyword sort (resp. sorts).
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Example 3.1.3. The following statements declare some of the operators needed
by DH.
ops sec n : Name Fresh -> Secret .
ops a b i : -> Name .
ops e d : Key Msg -> Msg .
The operator sec encodes secret information: the term sec(AName, r) (for
AName a variable of sort Name, and r a variable of sort Fresh) represents some
secret information known only by Alice. The nonce operator n is very similar,
except that it is used to represent nonces rather than arbitrary secret data.
The constants a, b, and i represent concrete names of distinct principals
(Alice, Bob, and the Intruder respectively).
The operators e and d represent encryption and decryption respectively.
Operator declarations that declare a single operator begin with op, while
operator declarations that declare multiple operators begin with ops, as done
above for sec and n.
Following the op keyword is a string of one or more tokens defining the
operator. The operator name is terminated by a space and colon. When defining
multiple operators in a single declaration, each operator must be separated from
the others by whitespace. If an operator containing whitespace is declared using
the ops keyword, then the operator must be wrapped in parentheses.
Following the colon is a space separated list of argument sorts, then an ASCII
arrow, then the result sort.
In Example 3.1.3, the non-constant operators sec, n, e, and d are declared
in prefix syntax. In other words, to encrypt a message M with a key K, we write
e(K, M). However, the Maude-PSL also allows the user to define operators using
mixfix syntax.
Example 3.1.4. The following is the mixfix operator for message concatena-
tion.
op _;_ : Msg Msg -> Msg .
The underscores represent where the operator’s arguments are placed. For
example, to concatenate two messages M and N we write M ; N (note the blank
spaces between M and ;, and between ; and N). When declaring a mixfix oper-
ator, there must be exactly as many underscores as there are argument sorts.
Finally, it is possible to assign certain attributes to each operator. In partic-
ular, we can declare binary operators to be associative, commutative, or having
a unit element, using the keywords assoc, comm, or id: c (with c a constant
of the appropriate sort), respectively. For parsing purposes (but not really as
equational axioms) we can avoid parentheses in a binary operator by requir-
ing the parser to parse terms as left- or right-associative using the attributes
gather(E e) or gather(e E) respectively.
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Example 3.1.5. Here we make the concatenation operator right-associative,
and declare also an associative-commutative operator for multiplying nonces.
op _;_ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather (e E)] .
op _*_ : MultipliedNonces MultipliedNonces
-> MultipliedNonces [assoc comm] .
In order to use the comm axiom, both operator arguments must have the
same sort. In order to use the assoc axiom, both arguments and the result
must have the same sort. For technical reasons, the Maude-NPA does not allow
assoc without comm, or id without comm and assoc.
The unit axiom id: should be used carefully, if at all. Treating the unit
as a built-in axiom can lead to unexpected non-termination, because the unit
axiom allows Maude to insert new terms (the unit constant) into other terms
at will. This is particularly problematic with the Maude-PSL, because the
equational theory is not executed directly by the user. Rather it is used behind
the scenes by a symbolic model-checker attempting to solve a semi-decidable
problem. Therefore, it may be difficult to realize that the protocol verification
is non-terminating, not because the search space is infinite, but because the unit
axiom has led to unexpected looping.
Any legal attribute in Maude is also a legal attribute in Maude-PSL. In
particular, this includes parsing precedence attributes, which may be useful if
the user is specifying a large number of mixfix operators. Chapter 3.9 of the
Maude Manual describes the operator precedences, while Chapter 4.4 describes
all other operator attributes ([6]). Note however that the only axioms that
are allowed are the comm, assoc and unit axioms as explained above. Axioms
are any attributes that influence the rewrite relation itself, rather than just the
writing and printing of terms.
To ease implementation, we assume that the user-defined operators are dis-
joint from the tokens used by the built-in syntax. For a list of built-in tokens,
see Appendix 6.3.
3.1.3 Algebraic Properties
Now that we know how to define the language of the protocol, the next step
is to specify the properties of the operators. Certain built-in properties (i.e.
associativity and commutativity) are already defined alongside the operators,
but what about others, such as the relationship between multiplication and
exponentiation? Such properties are defined as equations between terms.
Example 3.1.6. Mathematically, we define the relationship between exponen-
tiation and multiplication as follows:
(gy)z = gy∗z
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for g the base of the exponentiation, and y, z exponents. In Maude-PSL, using
the signature defined in Section 3.1.2, we write the above equation as follows:
var G : Gen . vars Y Z : MultipledNonces .
eq exp(exp(G, Y), Z) = exp(G, Y * Z) .
Each equation begins with the eq keyword, and ends with a space and pe-
riod. Contrary to equations in the mathematical sense, which are viewed in a
symmetric way (i.e. (gy)z = gy∗z and gy∗z = (gy)z are the same equation), in
the Maude-PSL, the orientation of an equation matters. This is because the
equations are used from left to right as simplification rules. Furthermore, how
the equation is oriented may have an impact on both its executability by sim-
plification and whether or not the theory terminates. To ensure termination,
equations should be written (from left to right) from “complex” to “simple,” the
idea being that every term, no matter how complex, will eventually become too
“simple” to reduce further. What “complex” and “simple” mean is dependent
upon the theory. Furthermore, the equational theory must also be confluent.
Equations are specified modulo the attributes commutativity, associativity,
and unit that may have been declared as part of the operator declarations. So
we could have just as easily written eq exp(exp(G,Y),Z) = exp(G, Z * Y)
. (where we have swapped the order of Z and Y in the multiplication). The
commutativity of * means that both equations are considered identical by the
Maude-PSL.
Note that because the Maude-PSL is translated into the strand-based lan-
guage used by Maude-NPA, the equational theory must meet the restrictions
imposed by Maude-NPA [12]. The restrictions are as follows:
1. If an operator has axioms, then those axioms must be commutative,
commutative-associative, or commutative-associative-identity. So an asso-
ciative operator is not allowed unless it is also commutative. Maude-PSL
will throw an error if an operator has an incompatible combination of
axioms.
2. The equations are confluent modulo the axioms. This is not automatically
checked.
3. The equations are terminating modulo the axioms. This is not automati-
cally checked.
4. The equations are coherent modulo the axioms [15]. The Maude-PSL
automatically makes equations coherent modulo the axioms, as discussed
in Chapter 2.1.4.
5. The equations have the finite variant property [13]. This is not automat-
ically checked.
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3.2 Protocol
To fully specify a protocol, we need to specify three pieces of information (and
an optional fourth):
1. The protocol’s input.
2. The protocol itself.
3. The protocol’s output.
4. (Optional) Shorthand for terms, referred to as definitions.
The protocol’s input and output are specified for each principal, while the
protocol itself is specified using an extension of the standard Alice-Bob syntax.
However, before we begin we must first draw a very important distinction
between three related but subtly different ideas: roles, role names, and role
patterns.
3.2.1 Roles
A role is one of the jobs that can be performed by a principal to execute the
protocol. At the very minimum, each protocol has an initiator role and a re-
sponder role. Many protocols also have a neutral third party role, such as for
example, a key server. Each role has a particular sequence of messages that it
must send and receive, as dictated by the protocol.
Meanwhile, a role name is the name we use to represent each role. For exam-
ple, Alice (A for short) is the name often used for the initiator role. Similarly,
Bob is the name often used for the receiver role, and Server can sometimes be
used as the name of a neutral third party role.
In the Maude-PSL we must explicitly name each role. The roles are named
using a space-separated list of identifiers prepended by the keyword roles:
roles role1 role2 ... roleN .
Example 3.2.1. Below, we name the two roles for DH: A (initiator) and B
(responder) roles.
roles A B .
Note that the order in which the names are declared does not matter.
Finally, we have role patterns. A role pattern is a principal’s approximation
of a role name based on the limited information available to that principal.
Role patterns are what variables of sort Name actually represent in our DH
specification.
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In the Alice-Bob notation, all three notions are conflated. Consider the first
step of DH: A → B : A,B, gpa . Here the initiator role with role name A is
sending a message containing the concatenation of two role patterns representing
the initiator’s and the responder’s name and half of the Diffie-Helman key. The
responder then receives an encrypted message containing two role patterns and
half of a Diffie-Helman key.
This distinction between roles, role names, and role patterns is important
to the Maude-PSL’s syntax, which endeavors to make explicit the knowledge
that each protocol may infer when receiving a message at each stage of protocol
execution. Roles are explicitly declared using the roles keyword declared above.
Role patterns are represented using variables (typically of type Name).
So in summary, we have two ways of identifying roles:
• role names - These are the true names of each role. They are explicitly
declared in the Maude-PSL using the roles keyword.
• role patterns - Potentially incorrect names associated with each role by
the principals based on their limited knowledge.
To ease exposition, when it is clear from context that a role pattern is an
accurate representation of a role name (e.g. the role pattern that represents
Alice’s knowledge of her own name), then we will refer to both as role names.
3.2.2 Principal Input
Each protocol makes certain assumptions about the starting knowledge of each
principal (for example, that Alice knows Bob’s name, or that Alice and Bob
already have a shared key).
These assumptions are codified by specifying input for each role.
Example 3.2.2. The following two statements specify the input of Alice and
Bob in the DH protocol.
vars ANAME BNAME : Name .
In(A) = ANAME , BNAME .
In(B) = BNAME .
Here, we assume that Alice knows both her name and Bob’s (she knows Bob’s
name, because she wants to speak with him). Bob only knows his own name,
because he doesn’t know for certain that it is Alice, as opposed to Claire, who
wishes to communicate with him.
The token In takes a role name as argument. The input is a comma-
separated list of variables, and must be defined for every role (since all roles
must at the very least know their own name, the input is guaranteed to be
non-empty). Note that although in the above example, all inputs are names, in
general the input variables may be of any sort.
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3.2.3 Protocol Specification
The protocol itself is specified using an extension of the Alice-Bob syntax that
makes explicit the viewpoint of each principal, and what each principal can infer
when receiving a message.
Example 3.2.3. Consider the Diffie-Helman public key authentication pro-
tocol, spelled out below [7]. Note that technically, the Diffie-Helman requires
the user to perform an exponentiation modulo a large prime number. This is
meant to help ensure that the exponentiation cannot be easily brute forced.
However we are only interested in attacks in which the attacker does not use
brute force, but rather manipulates the execution of the protocol to trick the
honest principals into revealing sensitive information, or to trick one honest
principal into thinking the intruder is a different honest principal. Therefore,
to simplify exposition, we will ignore the modulus operation, and focus only on
the exponentiation.
A represents the principal Alice, and B represents the principal Bob. M1;M2
is the concatenation of messages M1 and M2. e(K1,M1) is the encryption of
message M1 with key K1. PKA (resp. pkB) is the public key of A (resp. B).
SKA and SKB are the associated secret keys. NA is a nonce generated by A,
and NB is a nonce generated by B.
1. A→ B : A;B, gpa
2. B → A : A;B; gpb
3. A→ B : e((gpb)pa , s)
where pa and pb are the secret, large numbers used as exponents by A and B, g
is the shared base, and s is the secret information to be exchanged.
The following is the specification in the Maude-PSL.
vars AName BName A1Name : Name .
vars r1 r2 r3 : Fresh .
vars XEA XEB : Exp .
var S : Secret .
1 . A -> B : ANAME ; BNAME ;
exp(g, n(ANAME , r1))
|- A1NAME ; BNAME ; XEB .
2 . B -> A : A1NAME ; BNAME ;
exp(g, n(BNAME , r2))
|- ANAME ; BNAME ; XEA .
3 . A -> B : e(exp(XEA , n(ANAME , r1)),
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sec(ANAME , r3))
|- e(exp(XEB , n(BNAME , r2)),
S) .
Recall that A and B are the role names declared in Example 3.2.1.
The most obvious difference from the standard Alice-Bob notation is that
each message is split it into two different perspectives. The first term represents
the sender’s perspective of the message he/she is sending, while the second is
the receiver’s perspective of the message he/she is receiving.
Perspective
In the standard Alice-Bob notation, the protocol is described from an omniscient
point of view in an ideal world: we know exactly what is sent by the sender, and
we know that the receiver always receives that exact message. However, things
are messier in practice. Whenever a principal receives a message, he/she can
only derive a limited amount of information from the message. For example,
consider the message sent by Alice in the first step of DH: AName ; BName ;
exp(g, n(AName, r1)). When Bob receives the message, he does not know a
priori that it was sent by Alice, since he does not know ahead of time that he will
be speaking to Alice. Furthermore, he does not know what the value of Alice’s
nonce is, so he cannot break the exponentiated value into its component pieces
(base and exponent). Therefore, from his point of view, he receives a message
of the form A1Name ; BName ; XEB ., where A1Name is some role pattern that
may or may not be Alice’s name, and XEB is some exponentiated value that may
or may not have been generated by Alice.
The sharp-eyed reader may observe that when Alice sends the name BName
in the first step, Bob receives that exact same name, BName. Recall from Sec-
tion 3.2.2 that we assumed that both Alice and Bob know Bob’s name. There-
fore, Alice knows to send Bob’s name, and Bob expects (and can verify) that
the second name is his (we assume that although Bob does not know who he
will be communicating with, he does know that he will be using DH).
A perspective implicitly encodes the capabilities of a principal to decode a
message. Therefore, when building each perspective, the user has to ask him-
self/herself “What types of information can this principal reasonably derive?”
For example, we know that Bob can look inside the term e(exp(XEB, n(B,
r2)), S) and extract S, because the term is encrypted using the shared key
he has constructed with Alice. Furthermore, thanks to the properties of ex-
ponentiation and multiplication, we know that Bob will see the key as some
base XEB raised to his exponent n(B, r2). Alice meanwhile, sees the key as
e(exp(XEA, n(A, r1)) because she knows the value of her nonce, but has no
computationally easy way to derive Bob’s nonce.
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3.2.4 Role Names vs. Role Patterns
Observe that although B receives the name A1Name in the first step, in the second
step he sends his message to A, instead of some role A1. This is because of the
distinction between role names and role patterns discussed at the beginning of
the chapter. The character A is a role name, while A1Name is a role pattern.
Because of this distinction, the following two specifications are equivalent to
that found in example 3.2.3:
vars AName BName A1Name : Name .
vars r1 r2 r3 : Fresh .
vars XEA XEB : Exp .
var S : Secret .
roles initiator responder .
1 . initiator -> responder : ANAME ; BNAME ;
exp(g, n(AName , r1))
|- A1NAME ; BNAME ;
XEB .
2 . responder -> initiator : A1NAME ; BNAME ;
exp(g, n(BNAME , r2))
|- ANAME ; BNAME ;
XEA .
3 . initiator -> responder :
e(exp(XEA , n(ANAME , r1)), sec(ANAME , r3)) |-
e(exp(XEB , n(BNAME , r2)), S)
and
vars A B A1 : Name .
vars r1 r2 r3 : Fresh .
vars XEA XEB : Exp .
var S : Secret .
roles A B .
1 . A -> B : A ; B ; exp(g, n(A, r1))
|- A1 ; B ; XEB .
2 . B -> A : A1 ; B ; exp(g, n(B, r2))
|- A ; B ; XEA .
3 . A -> B : e(exp(XEA , n(A, r1)), sec(A, r3))
|- e(exp(XEB , n(B, r2)), S) .
Note in the third version that the same characters (A and B) are used to
represent both the role names and the role patterns. This is perfectly legal,
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and may make the specification more concise and closer to Alice-Bob notation.
However, the user runs the risk of conflating role names and patterns if he/she
uses this style.
Once a role name has been chosen, it must be used throughout the entire
specification. For example, in the second version of the specification, where the
initiator role is named initiator, the input must be specified as In(initiator)
= ANAME, BNAME ..
The Maude-PSL enforces that all variables between roles are disjoint with
the exception of those declared in the role’s inputs. If the same variable shows
up in both Alice’s and Bob’s inputs, then that same variable may be used in
both Alice’s and Bob’s perspectives.
3.2.5 Principal Output
A principal’s output is very similar to the input, and has a very similar syntax.
A principal’s output is a set of terms that the user deems to be “important,”
and that are (or can be) generated from terms in the protocol and input. For
example, since the whole point of DH is to establish a shared key between Alice
and Bob, the two perspectives on the shared key can be deemed important.
Example 3.2.4. The following are the outputs of Alice and Bob for our spec-
ification of DH
Out(A) = exp(XEA , n(A, r1)) .
Out(B) = exp(XEB , n(B, r2)) .
Note that the variables in the output terms of a particular role must have
already appeared in the role’s half of the protocol, or in the role’s input. How-
ever, a term does not have to appear in the input or in the protocol specification
in order to be considered output.
Output is meant to be used for protocol composition, and is included for
future compatibility.
3.2.6 Definitions
In protocols of even moderate complexity (such as Otway-Rees [24]), the terms
used in the specification quickly become painfully large. In complicated terms,
it is often difficult to quickly separate out and mentally compartmentalize sub-
terms into the purposes they are meant to serve (for example, recognizing the
term n(A, r1) as the exponent in the term exp(g, n(A, r1))). Furthermore,
it is not unusual in a cryptographic protocol for a term to be repeated many
times, for example when encrypting multiple messages with the same key. As
a result, any time that a term is modified, it needs to be manually changed
everywhere in the protocol (and potentially in the attacks), which is highly
error-prone.
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To ease this burden we allow users to define what are essentially let state-
ments for terms, referred to as definitions.
Example 3.2.5. The following are some definitions for our DH specification.
Def(A) = pa := n(AName , r1),
secret := sec(AName , r’) .
Def(B) = pb := n(BName , r2) .
Observe that the definitions are specific to each role. Furthermore, the
definition names (pa, s, pb) of each role must be disjoint from the names used
by other roles, and from variable and operator names.
Using these definitions gives us the following protocol specification:
1 . A -> B : AName ; BName ; exp(g, pa)
|- A1Name ; BName ; XEB .
2 . B -> A : A1Name ; BName ; exp(g, pb)
|- AName ; BName ; XEA .
3 . A -> B : e(exp(XEA , pa), secret)
|- e(exp(XEB , pb), S) .
This is both visually simpler than the specification in example 3.2.3 and also
much closer to the original Alice-Bob description. Internally, each definition
name is replaced by the corresponding term in a simple token replacement. So
if we have a definition xp := exp(g, M), and a term exp(xp, M), then exp(xp,
M) will be automatically replaced with exp(exp(g, M), M).
Definition names may be any identifier and definitions may be used in other
definitions (though be careful not to create circular dependencies). To illustrate,
consider the following alternative set of definitions:
Def(A) = pa := n(A, r1),
s := sec(A, r’),
g^pa := exp(g, pa),
xea^pa := exp(XEA , pa) .
Def(B) = g^pb := exp(g, pb),
pb := n(B, r2),
xeb^pb := exp(XEB , pb) .
Note that the order in which the definitions are defined does not matter. For
example, we are defining g^pb using pb before we have defined pb. This is
perfectly legal.
Using these definitions gives us the following specification:
1 . A -> B : A ; B ; g^pa
|- A1 ; B ; XEB .
2 . B -> A : A1 ; B ; g^pb
|- A ; B ; XEA .
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3 . A -> B : e(xea^pa, secret)
|- e(xeb^pb, S) .
which is even closer to the original Alice-Bob description of the protocol. How-
ever, while on the face of it this may seem like an appropriate use of definitions,
it is not. Definitions are meant to give names to complex terms. They are not
meant to give the user a poor man’s user-defined syntax. Especially since a very
powerful system of user-defined syntax is already provided! If the user desires
mixfix exponentiation, then the user should define a mixfix operator ^ and
use that instead.
For an example of the proper use of non-trivial definitions, see Chapter 5,
in which we specify the Otway-Rees protocol.
3.3 Intruder
The Intruder section defines the capabilities of the intruder. In the Maude-PSL
it is assumed that the Intruder has complete control over the network: he/she
can intercept messages, destroy messages, and inject his/her own messages into
the communication at will. All that remains to be specified is what kinds of
messages the Intruder can create, and what he needs to know to create them.
Therefore, an intruder capability takes the form of an implication: if the
intruder knows terms t1, t2, . . . , tn, then he/she can learn t
′
1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m.
Example 3.3.1. The following are the intruder capabilities for the DH speci-
fication.
var r : Fresh . var P : Name .
vars M1 M2 : Msg . vars NS1 NS2 : Nonce .
var K : Key . var GE : GeneratorOrExp .
K, M1 => e(K, M1), d(K, M1) .
NS1 , NS2 => NS1 * NS2 .
GE , NS1 => exp(GE, NS1) .
M1 ; M2 <=> M1 , M2 .
=> n(i, r), g, P .
The statement
K, M1 => e(K, M1), d(K, M1) reads: “If the Intruder knows a key K and a
message M1, then he/she can learn the terms e(K, M1) and d(K, M1).” In other
words, if the intruder has a key, then he/she can encrypt an arbitrary message
with said key, or attempt to decrypt an arbitrary message with said key.
The statement M1 ; M2 <=> M1, M2 . says that the Intruder can concate-
nate arbitrary messages, and split concatenated messages into their component
pieces.
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The statement => n(i, r), g, P. says that the Intruder can generate
his/her own nonces, he/she knows the generator being used by Alice and Bob,
and he/she knows every role’s name.
3.4 Attacks
The Attacks section contains a sequence of numbered attack patterns. Each
attack pattern encodes an attack that the protocol needs to be proven secure
against. Currently, the attack syntax is geared towards specifying two kinds of
attacks: a violation of secrecy (in which the intruder learns a particular term
that is supposed to be private), and a violation of authentication (in which Alice
erroneously believes she has successfully executed the protocol with Bob).
Before we dive into the syntax for attack patterns, we first need to define
the variables of a role. The variables of a role are represented as a set of all the
variables that appear in the input and terms associated with a particular role.
Example 3.4.1. Recall the DH specification from example 3.2.3 with the input
from example 3.2.2:
vars AName BName A1Name : Name .
vars r1 r2 r3 : Fresh .
vars XEA XEB : Exp .
var S : Secret .
In(A) = AName , BName .
In(B) = BName .
1 . A -> B : AName ; BName ;
exp(g, n(AName , r1))
|- A1Name ; BName ; XEB .
2 . B -> A : A1Name ; BName ;
exp(g, n(BName , r2))
|- AName ; BName ; XEA .
3 . A -> B : e(exp(XEA , n(AName , r1)),
sec(AName , r3))
|- e(exp(XEB , n(BName , r2)),
S) .
Then, the variables of the role A are AName, BName, r1, XEA, r3, while the
variables for role B are A1Name, BName, XEB, r2, S.
When using definitions, the variables are computed after expanding the
definitions. For example, consider a version of the above specification, where
we use the definitions from example 3.2.5:
In(A) = AName , BName .
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In(B) = BName .
1 . A -> B : AName ; BName ; exp(g, pa)
|- A1Name ; BName ; XEB .
2 . B -> A : A1Name ; BName ; exp(g, pb)
|- AName ; BName ; XEA .
3 . A -> B : e(exp(XEA , n(AName , r1)),
secret)
|- e(exp(XEB , n(BName , r2)),
S) .
Here, both A and B have the exact same variables as the first specification.
Each variable (with the exception of a variable of sort Fresh, which is solely
an implementation artifact) represents a possible blind spot, i.e. a piece of data
that could potentially be changed without affecting a “successful” execution
of the protocol. For example, AName represents a blind spot in the sense that
there is nothing forcing Alice to send her actual name to Bob, and Bob would
never know: she could decide to send Claire’s name instead. Meanwhile, the
variable XEB encodes the fact that there is no guarantee that Bob actually
receives the half-key generated by Alice: he might receive a half-key generated
by the intruder. Determining whether or not these are actual blind spots is of
course the entire purpose of the Maude-PSL and Maude-NPA.
Now, we can examine the syntax for specifying attacks.
Example 3.4.2. The following are four sample attack patterns from the DH
specification.
0 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a, BName |-> b,
S |-> sec(a, r’) .
without:
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = AName |-> a, BName |-> b .
1 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a, BName |-> b,
S |-> sec(a, r’) .
Intruder learns sec(a, r’) .
2 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a, S |-> sec(a, r’) .
With constraints BName != a .
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Intruder learns sec(a, r’) .
Note that the constants a, and b were declared in example 3.1.3 as constants
of sort Name. The first attack represents an authentication attack, the second a
secrecy attack. The third is similar to the second, except slightly more general
(the role pattern B may be any term of sort Name except a).
Observe that no variables are declared. The Attack section uses all of the
same variables as the Protocol section, because the semantics of the Attack
and Protocol section are inextricably linked through variable instantiation. The
vast majority of the time, the attack patterns and the protocol will use the
same variables. Furthermore, most of the cases in which an attack pattern
uses a new variable will be because the variable is misnamed. If the misnamed
variable is not caught, then it will introduce a subtle error in which a protocol
execution is not properly instantiated. Forcing the Attack section to have the
same variables as the Protocol section allows us to easily catch these kinds of
errors. Note that a variable does not have to be used in the Protocol section
to be used in the Attack section, it merely needs to be declared in the Protocol
section. Therefore, the user may still introduce new variables into an attack if
so desired.
“B executes protocol .” tells us that Bob will fully execute his half of the
protocol. It is also possible to specify a partial execution using “B executes
up to N.”, where N is the number of steps in the protocol Bob should execute.
For example, suppose we wish to see if an attack is possible within the first two
steps of the protocol. Then, we would write “B executes up to 2 .”.
“Subst(B) = A1 |-> a, B |-> b, S |-> sec(a, r’) .” defines a sub-
stitution instantiating a subset of the variables associated with Bob. Typically,
this is used to fix the names in the protocol to particular names (represented
by user-provided constants like a, b, or i). This allows us to define precisely
which name Bob actually recieves. For example, in all three attacks, the fact
that we are instantiating A1 to a means that Bob is in fact receiving Alice’s
name. If we wished to consider an attack where Bob definitely receives someone
else’s name, we would instead map A1 to either i or some other constant de-
fined in the Equational Theory. For every statement of the form “P executes
protocol .” there must be defined a corresponding substitution. However,
substitutions may be provided for principals without a corresponding execution
statement. Furthermore, the substitutions need to be well-formed order-sorted
substitutions. If the user wishes to use the identity substitution, then the user
must use the special keyword id. So the statement “Subst(B) = id .” defines
Bob’s substitution as the identity substitution. If the substitution is not the
identity, then the domain of the substitution, and the variables contained in the
range of the substitution should be disjoint.
The statement “Intruder learns sec(a, r’) .” defines the intruder
knowledge. If the intruder should know more than one term, then the terms
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should be specified as a comma-separated list. Furthermore, the defined substi-
tution will be applied to the intruder knowledge, so writing Intruder learns
sec(A1Name, r’) . is equivalent to writing Intruder learns sec(a, r’) ..
It should also be noted that terms in the intruder knowledge do not have to ex-
actly match terms that appear in the protocol. In particular, the user is free
to rename variables as he/she desires. For example, writing Intruder learns
sec(C, r’) . is equivalent to writing Intruder learns sec(D, r’) . for
variables C, D of sort name. Of course, in the above attacks, Intruder learns
sec(C, r’) . is not equivalent to writing Intruder learns sec(A1Name,
r’) . because A1Name will be instantiated to the constant a, but C will not.
The without: keyword allows us to specify protocol executions that can’t
happen during the specified attack. For example, attack 0 ask whether it is
possible for Bob to execute the protocol without Alice executing the protocol
as well. Intruder knowledge statements may not appear in without blocks.
This is because of a subtlety in how Maude-NPA works. Maude-NPA works
by performing backwards state space exploration. In other words, Maude-NPA
begins at the attack state and goes backwards (i.e. into the past) until it reaches
an initial state, or has explored all possible paths. There is another environment
very similar to the without: blocks: the state-space-reduction blocks:
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A1NAME |-> a, B1NAME |-> b .
state -space -reduction:
avoid:
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = A1NAME |-> a .
Intruder learns sec(a, r’) .
avoid:
...
The avoid blocks have no restrictions on which attack statements appear in-
side of them. The state-space-reduction environment is translated into the
same thing as without blocks within Maude-NPA (never patterns). However,
they are meant solely to optimize the search. They are not meant to contain any
semantic information about the attack itself. Note that when one uses the state-
space-reduction environment to optimize an attack, one risks losing soundness.
In other words, if the specifier is not careful, he/she may optimize out a valid
attack. Therefore, like all optimizations, the state-space-reduction environ-
ment is best avoided unless the specifier really understands how Maude-NPA
works.
The statement With constraints B != a . allows us to impose certain
restrictions on how the principal’s terms may be instantiated during model
checking. For example, the above statement says that the role pattern B may
not be instantiated to the concrete name a. However, it may be instantiated
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to any other term of sort Name (i.e. b or i) during the model checking process.
Constraints are specified as a comma-separated list of disequalities of the form
T1 != T2 where T1 and T2 are arbitrary terms. Multiple constraints are treated
as a conjunction. Constraints are not used often, but they are for example
invaluable when proving indistinguishability properties [26].
It is also possible to have multiple principals executing the protocol in a
single attack pattern.
Example 3.4.3. The following is an attack pattern similar to pattern 1 in
example 3.4.2, except with both Alice and Bob executing the protocol.
3 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a, BName |-> b,
S |-> sec(a, r’) .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = AName |-> a, BName |-> b .
Intruder learns sec(a, r’) .
In this case, the union of all the defined substitutions are applied to the
Intruder knowledge. So the attack in example 3.4.3 is equivalent to
4 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a, BName |-> b,
S |-> sec(a, r’) .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = AName |-> a, BName |-> b .
Intruder learns sec(AName , r’) .
All substitutions must agree on shared variables. So in example 3.4.3, since
Bob’s substitution maps B to b, Alice’s substitution must map B to b, and vice
versa.
It is also possible to use the definitions in 3.2 in the attack patterns. However,
if a definition is used, there must be a substitution defined for the associated
role.
Example 3.4.4. The following is not a legal attack pattern, because the secret
definition (which is associated with Alice) is being used in an attack pattern that
only has a substitution defined for Bob’s variables.
1 .
B executes protocol .
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Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a,
BName |-> b, S |-> secret .
Intruder learns secret .
On the other hand, the following attack pattern is legal.
1 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = AName |-> a, BName |-> b .
Intruder learns secret .
because there is a substitution defined for Alice, for whom secret is defined.
A sharp-eyed reader may also observe that secret is equivalent to the term
sec(A, r’). So a literal reading of the substitution would seem to suggest that
S is being mapped to sec(A, r’), violating our requirement that the domain
of the substitution be disjoint from the variables in the range. In order to deal
with this, internally the Maude-PSL applies each substitution to itself until
it reaches an idempotent fixed point. The resulting idempotent substitution
is then used instead of the substitution defined by the user. Of course, it is
possible to define a substitution for which there is no idempotent fixed point,
such as {A 7→ B,B 7→ A}. To handle this possibility, the translator throws
an error if it fails to reach a fixed point after 100 applications. An important
consequence of the computation of an idempotent fixed point substitution is
the implicit assumption that the user desires a consistent instantiation across
all the terms in the attacks. If the user desires an inconsistent instantiation
between protocol roles and intruder knowledge (say, instantiating the variable
AName to a in Alice’s substitution, but mapping the secret sec(AName, r3) in
the intruder knowledge to sec(b, r3)), then the user must manually instantiate
the Intruder’s knowledge.
3.5 Conclusion
The syntax and organization above makes the Maude-PSL an expressive, and
simple language. It allows the user to keep the different parts of the specification
separate, which allow for easier reuse. It allows the user to define non-trivial
algebraic properties for his/her protocol to use. It allows the user to specify the
protocol in a manner very close to the high-level Alice-Bob definition. Finally,
it provides the user with great flexibility and clarity when defining attacks.
The next question is: Is this specification language sufficiently precise? That
is, does this language formally specify a protocol in sufficient detail to perform
formal verification? This will be answered in the affirmative in the next section,
in which we define the formal semantics of the language in terms of strands.
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Chapter 4
Rewriting Semantics of PSL
In this chapter we the formal semantics of the Maude-PSL as a rewrite theory
(Σ, E unionmultiB,R) that transforms Maude-PSL programs into sets of strands, which
have a well-understood semantics with respect to protocol verification [28]. The
set of rules R contains the translation rules themselves, while the set of equa-
tions E defines a variety of helper functions, syntax desugaring, and structural
simplifications. The set of equations B contains equational properties that are
not amenable to oriented equations, such as the associativity and commutativity
of operators.
This semantics has been implemented directly in Maude, and is used to
translate Maude-PSL-specifications into Maude-NPA specifications. As a result,
the following rewrite rules use the flavor of strands used by Maude-NPA. See
Chapter 2.2.4 for details about Maude-NPA strands.
4.1 Bird’s Eye View of the Translation
The translation takes place inside of an ACU soup, which is represented by the
sort TranslationData (see Figure 4.1 for a visual representation). The following
are included inside a single TranslationData term:
1. The PSL-specification as an associative-commutative soup of sections:
Theory, Protocol, Intruder, and Attacks. Each section contains an as-
sociative list of statements with the identity symbol pass.
2. Intermediate data structures that the PSL specification will be translated
into, which are then translated into Maude-NPA code.
The bulk of the rules extract data from the provided PSL-statements, and
then insert that data into the appropriate intermediate data structures. Once
the entirety of the PSL-specification has been translated, these intermediate
data structures are then converted into the Maude-NPA module
PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION (see Figure 4.2). Note that these semantics
assume that the user-defined equational theory has already been converted
into the PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS, and PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-
ALGEBRAIC modules. This is a trivial process (barely more than an auto-
mated copy-paste), the details of which are omitted.
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TranslationData
PSL
Specification StrandData
AttackData StrandSet
definitions
Figure 4.1: The largest oval represents the soup in which the other entities
are floating. The smaller ovals represent distinct entities within that soup. PSL
Specification is the PSL specification to be translated. StrandData is a mapping
from roles to strands (used for building the protocol strands). StrandSet is a set
of strands (used to build the Intruder capabilities). AttackData is a mapping
from numbers to Maude-NPA states (used to build the Maude-NPA attack
patterns). Definitions is the set of user-provided definitions.
4.2 Signature
The signature Σ decomposes into the disjoint union: NPA unionmulti P unionmulti Ω unionmultiH where
1. NPA is the Maude-NPA signature [12].
2. P is all the user-defined operators, plus several enrichments. The enrich-
ments are:
(a) All user-declared sorts are made subsorts of Msg (a sort provided by
the Maude-NPA signature) if they are not so already.
(b) A free operator $; : Msg Msg → Msg , which will be used
internally, is added to the signature.
(c) For every definition T := t, with t a term of sort s, a constant T :→ s
is added to the signature.
(d) All operators in P are made frozen if they are not so already. Essen-
tially, if an operator is frozen, then Maude will not attempt to rewrite
any subterms of the frozen operator. This allows Maude-NPA code to
have complete control over how terms are rewritten. See the Maude
Manual for more details about frozen operators [6].
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TranslationData
PSL
Specification StrandData
StrandSet AttackData
PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION
eq ATTACK-STATE(0) = ...
eq STRANDS-DOLEV-YAO = ...
eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL = ...
definitions
Figure 4.2: The square along the bottom of the diagram represents the Maude-
NPA module PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION. Each square contains the begin-
ning of a (set of) statement(s) required by the PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION
module. StrandData, AttackData, and StrandSet are all populated using data
extracted from PSL Specification, and definitions. The Maude-NPA attack
states are built using information from StrandData and AttackData. The Dolev-
Yao strands are built from StrandSet, while the protocol strands are built from
StrandData.
3. Ω contains all of the operators and sorts used to encode the
PSL-specification and data structures used in the translation.
4. H contains the symbols for internal helper functions.
4.2.1 Contents of Ω
Ω contains a sort TranslationData that consists of an ACU soup of data struc-
tures. The first data structure is a mapping from roles to triples. Each triple
contains a strand, the strand’s input, and the strand’s output (see Chapter 2.2.4
for details about input and output of a strand):
mt : → StrandData
7→ { } { } : Role MsgSet Strand MsgSet → StrandDatum
& : StrandData StrandData → StrandData
[ ] : StrandData → TranslationData
where StrandDatum is a subsort of StrandData, the operator & is ACU
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with identity mt, and Strand is a sort defined by Maude-NPA.
Example 4.2.1. The following describes the initiator role of DH from Exam-
ple 3.2.3 with the input from Example 3.2.2 and the output from Example 3.2.4
as a term of sort StrandDatum:
A 7→ {AName,BName}
:: r1 :: [nil|
+ (AName; BName; exp(g, n(AName, r1))),
− (AName; BName; XEA),
+ (e(exp(XEB , n(BName, r2)), S),
nil]
{exp(XEA, n(A, r1))}.
The subsignature Ω also contains an operator for associating numbers with
attack patterns:
[ 7→ ] : Nat System → AttackData
where System is a sort of Maude-NPA attack patterns.
Finally, Ω contains injection functions from AttackData into Translation-
Data, and from StrandSet (a sort provided by Maude-NPA) into Translation-
Data:
[ ] : AttackData → TranslationData
[ ] : StrandSet → TranslationData.
4.3 Semantics
The following rules assume that some simple pre-processing has already been
performed on the specification. In particular, it is assumed that when com-
putation begins, the PSL-specification is floating in an AC soup with several
other terms: a set of Definitions(see Chapter 3.2.6) that have already been ex-
tracted from the specification, an empty set of StrandData that will represent
the protocol strands, and an empty set of strands that will represent the in-
truder capabilities. Note that both the empty set of StrandData and the empty
StrandSet will be populated as computation progresses. Furthermore, we do not
assume that the soup contains an empty set of attack patterns. The generation
of the empty set of attack patterns is used to ensure that the Protocol section is
translated before the Attack section. More details can be found in Section 4.3.3.
Example 4.3.1. Suppose the user has declared the following definitions as part
of a larger PSL specification P :
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Def(A) = nA := n(AName , r) .
Def(B) = nB := n(BName , r1) .
where A and B are roles, n is an operator for building nonces, AName and BName
are variables of sort Name and r and r1 are variables of sort Fresh. Then, we
begin executing the semantics with the following term:
P [nA := n(AName, r),nB := n(BName, r1)] [empty .StrandSet ]
[mt .StrandData]
As computation proceeds, P will be eliminated one statement at a time,
while the terms [empty .StrandSet ] and [mt .StrandData] are populated. Once
the set of StrandData has been fully populated, the term [mt .AttackData] will
be created and then populated.
4.3.1 Protocol
The Protocol semantics consist of two rules (not including error detection): one
for processing the input and output, and one for processing each step in the
protocol. The rules are shown in Figure 4.3.
The function fresh extracts the fresh variables from the passed term (if any),
while applyDefs applies the user-provided definitions to the passed term. Both
functions rely heavily on the reflective capabilities of rewriting logic, making
them rather complex, and not particularly enlightening. Therefore, their defi-
nitions are omitted.
Rule 4.1 generates an empty strand for each role, while rule 4.2 populates
the generated strands with the appropriate messages, following an algorithm
inspired by work by Chevalier and Rusinowitch [5]. However, rule 4.1 does not
fire unless a role has an input and an output associated with it. Furthermore,
observe that the strands are actually generated with the time keeping bar (|) at
the end of the strand, rather than at the beginning. However, this is immaterial.
First, the notion of a present is a necessity of the implementation of the Maude-
NPA, not an inherent property of strands. Furthermore, while the protocol
strands require the bar to be at the beginning of the strand, the attack strands
typically have the bar at the end. Therefore, when these strands are used to
build a Maude-NPA specification, the bar will be shifted appropriately.
4.3.2 Intruder
The semantics for the Intruder section consists of a single rule, a helper function,
and several equations that perform syntactic desugaring.
Figure 4.4 contains the desugaring equations, while Figure 4.5 contains the
single rule.
The function signedList takes a list of messages, ms, and a single message,
m. It returns a list of signed messages, where all the messages in ms are marked
50
Protocol
p1 In(R) = i. p2 Out(R) = o. p3
s [d] [sd ]
−→ (4.1)
Protocol
p1 p2 p3
[d]
[R 7→ {i} :: nil :: [nil|nil]{applyDefs(o, d)} & sd ]
Protocol
n. A→ B : mA ` mB .
p1
[d]
[A 7→ {iA} :: fA :: [lA|nil]{oA}&
B 7→ {iB} :: fB :: [lB |nil]{oA}&
sd ]
−→ (4.2)
Protocol
p1
[d]
[A 7→
{iA} :: fA, fresh(applyDefs(mA, d)) ::
[lA,+(applyDefs(mA, d))|nil]{oA}&
B 7→
{iB} :: fB ::
[lB ,−(applyDefs(mB , d))|nil]{oA}&
sd ]
Figure 4.3: Semantics for the Protocol Section. R is a role. p1, p2, p3 are lists of
statements in Protocol. d is the set of definitions (Section 3.2.6), sd is strand data
(Section 4.2). Variables i and o are lists of messages. N is a natural number, A and
B are both roles, mA and mB are both messages, and iA, iB , oA, and oB are lists of
messages. Finally, lA, and lB are lists of signed messages.
with a minus sign, while m is marked with a plus sign. See Section 4.3.1 for an
explanation of the functions applyDefs and fresh.
4.3.3 Attacks
The Attack semantics is the most complex, with two rules and three non-trivial
helper functions. The first rule handles attacks that contain without blocks,
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(⇒ ms.) = (∅ ⇒ ms.)
(ms ⇒ m1,m2,ms1.) = (ms ⇒ m1.)(ms ⇒ m2,ms1 .)
(ms1 ⇔ ms2.) = (ms1 ⇒ ms2.)(ms2 ⇒ ms1.)
Figure 4.4: Desugaring equations for intruder capabilities. The variables ms,ms1 ,
and ms2 are lists of messages, while m, m1 and m2 are messages. The constant ∅ is
an empty list of messages. Parentheses are solely to improve readability.
Intruder
ms ⇒ m.
i
[s] [d]
−→
Intruder
i
[d]
[:: fresh(m) :: [nil| signedList(applyDefs(ms, d), applyDefs(m, d))] & s]
Figure 4.5: Translation semantics for the Intruder section. The variable ms is a list
of messages, m is a message, and i is a sequence of PSL statements. The variable s is
a set of strands, and d is the set of user provided definitions.
while the second rule handles attacks that do not contain without blocks.
Attack statements are split into two categories: the core block, and a set
of without blocks. Core blocks are sets of execution statements (A executes
protocol .), substitution statements (Subst(A) = A |-> a .), intruder
knowledge statements (Intruder learns a .), and constraint statements
(With constraints a != B .). A without block is a core block prefixed by
the without: keyword. Observe that in the semantics, a without block has
fewer restrictions than they do at the syntactic level(see Chapter 3.4). This is
because without: and avoid blocks are turned into never patterns. By making
the semantics more flexible than the syntax allows, we can reduce avoid blocks
to without blocks.
Example 4.3.2. Consider the attack from Example 3.4.2:
0 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a, BName |-> b,
S |-> sec(a, r’) .
without:
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = AName |-> a, BName |-> b .
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Here, B executes protocol . and Subst(B) = A1Name |-> a, BName |->
b, S |-> sec(a, r’) are part of a core block, while A executes protocol .
and Subst(A) = AName |-> a, BName |-> b . form a without block.
The semantics for the Attack section can be found in Figure 4.6. K and S in
the rules in Figure 4.6 are constants that Maude-NPA will interpret as variables
of sort IntruderKnowledge and StrandSet respectively.
In order to guarantee that the strands have been fully processed before we
use them to populate the attacks, we also have the following equation:
Protocol pass = [mt .AttackData]
where mt .AttackData is the identity element for attack data. Since both rules
in Figure 4.6 assume that a set of attack data already exists somewhere in the
soup (represented by [ad ] in both rules), neither rule will fire until the Protocol
section has been completely translated.
Unlike in the other sections, the helper (partial) functions used for translat-
ing the attacks are non-trivial, and each will be considered in turn. The first
we will look at is subst, which is defined in Figure 4.7. This function accom-
plishes two tasks. First, it takes the disjoint union of the attack substitutions,
to get a new substitution θ. Then, it attempts to build an idempotent substi-
tution from θ as described in Chapter 3.4. To accomplish this, subst depends
on three partial functions: makeIdem, isValid and extractSubst. The function
extractSubst is a straightforward function that extracts and takes the union of
all substitution statements defined in the passed core attack. isValid meanwhile
checks that the substitution, θ, returned by extractSubst is a valid order-sorted
substitution. If θ is an order-sorted substitution, then isValid returns the sub-
stitution unchanged. Otherwise, isValid is undefined. makeIdem attempts to
make the passed substitution idempotent. The definitions of all three functions
can also be found in Figure 4.7.
The function containsSubst returns true if the passed core attack has at
least one substitution statement, and false otherwise. Given a substitution,
θ, the partial function checkSorts returns θ iff θ is a well-formed order-sorted
substitution. Much like applyDefs, checkSorts relies on the reflective capabilities
of rewriting logic. As a result, despite being relatively straightforward (for each
mapping x 7→ t, check if the sort of t is a subsort of the sort of x), the definition
is rather technical. Therefore, it is ommitted.
Next, consider the function genAttStrands, defined in Figure 4.8.
The function prefix takes a strand, :: r :: [±m1,±m2, . . . ,±mn, . . . ,±mp]
and a natural number n, and returns a strand of the form
:: r :: [±m1,±m2, . . . ,±mn|L] where L is a constant representing a list of signed
messages, which will be treated as a variable by Maude-NPA. In other words,
when a role R executes up to N , the role is actually executing the first N steps of
the role, and then doing whatever he/she wants, be it the rest of the protocol,
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Attacks
n. c w
a
[d] [sd ] [ad ]
−→
Attacks
a
s [d] [sd ]
[[n 7→ genAttStrands(c, subst(c), sd , d) & S
|| genIntKnowledge(c, subst(c), d), K
||nil
||nil
||never(genNeverPatterns(w, sd , d))]
ad ]
Attacks
n. c
a
s [sd ] [d] [ad ]
−→
Attacks
a
[d] [sd ]
[[n 7→ genAttStrands(c, subst(c), sd , d) & S
|| genIntKnowledge(c, subst(c), d), K
||nil
||nil
||nil ]]
Figure 4.6: The semantics for attacks. The first rule handles the case where an
attack contains at least one without block. The second handles the case where
there are no without blocks. The variable n is a number, c is a set of core
attack statements, and w a set of without blocks. The variable a represents the
rest of the attack section, while d is the set of definitions. sd is the strand data
computed by the rules in Figure 4.3, and ad is the set of other attacks that have
already been translated.
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subst(c, d) = makeIdem(isValid(extractSubst(c, d)))
extractSubst(Subst(r) = θ. c, d) = applyDefs(θ, d), extractSubst(c, d)
extractSubst(c, d) = none if ¬ containsSubst(c)
isValid(θ) = checkSorts(isFunction(θ))
isFunction(m1 7→ m2,m1 7→ m2, θ) = isFunction(m1 7→ m2, θ)
isFunction(m1 7→ m2, θ) = m1 7→ m2, isFunction(θ) if m1 6∈ Dom(θ)
isFunction(∅) = ∅
makeIdem(θ) = makeIdem(θ, θ, false, 0)
makeIdem(θ1, θ2, false, n) = makeIdem(θ1, θ2θ1, θ2 == θ2θ1, s(n))
if n ≤ 100.
makeIdem(θ1, θ2, true, n) = θ2
Figure 4.7: Definition of the function subst, which returns the substitution used
to instantiate attack strands. The variable c is a set of attack statements,
d the user-defined definitions, and θ, θ1, and θ2 are (potential) substitutions.
Variables m1 and m2 are of sort Msg, and n is a natural number.
genAttStrands(R executes protocol . c, θ, R 7→ {i}s{o} & sd , d) =
applyDefs(s, d)θ & genAttStrands(c, θ, R 7→ {i}s{o} & sd , d)
genAttStrands(R executes up to n. c, θ, R 7→ {i}s{o} & sd , d) =
applyDefs(prefix(s, n), d)θ & genAttStrands(c, θ, R 7→ {i}s{o} & sd , d)
genAttStrands(c, θ, sd , d) =
∅ if ¬hasExecutionStmt(c)
Figure 4.8: Definition of the partial function genAttStrands. R is a role, c a set
of core attack statements, θ is an order-sorted substitution, i a set of variables,
s is a strand, and o a set of terms. sd is a set of strand data, d is a set of
definitions, and n is a natural number.
nothing, or some random set of messages. The predicate hasExecutionStmt
checks whether or not there is an execution statement in a core attack c.
The partial function genIntKnowledge is defined in Figure 4.9. The con-
straint statements are handled by genIntKnowledge as well, because Maude-
NPA uses the same part of the state for both the disequality constraints and
the intruder knowledge (though conceptually, disequality constraints are not a
part of the intruder knowledge). Furthermore, since both the Maude-PSL and
Maude-NPA use the same syntax for disequality constraints, no special trans-
formations need to be performed. Finally, hasIntruderStmt is a predicate on
core attacks that returns true if there is at least one intruder knowledge or
constraint statement in the passed core attack.
Finally, we have the function genNeverPatterns, defined in Figure 4.10. Ob-
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genIntKnowledge(Intruder learns M. c, θ, d) = inI(applyDefs(M,d)θ),
genIntKnowledge(c, θ, d)
genIntKnowledge(With constraints E. c, θ, d) = applyDefs(E, d)θ,
genIntKnowledge(c, θ, d)
genIntKnowledge(c, θ, d) = ∅ if ¬hasIntruderStmt(c)
inI(m,M) = m inI , inI(M)
inI(∅) = nil
Figure 4.9: Definition of genIntKnowledge. M is a set of messages, c is a set
of core attack statements, θ is an order-sorted substitution, and d is a set of
definitions. E is a set of disequalities between messages, and m is a message.
serve that each never pattern is computed using its own substitution, derived
from the substitution statements defined as part of the without block. As such,
the substitution for each without block is independent of the substitution com-
puted for the core of the attack, and of substitutions for other without blocks.
genNeverPatterns((without : c)w, sd , d) = neverPattern(c, sd , d)
genNeverPatterns(w, sd , d)
genNeverPatterns(∅) = nil
neverPattern(c, sd , d) = genAttStrands(c, subst(c), sd , d)&S
|| genIntKnowledge(c, subst(c, d)),K
Figure 4.10: Semantics for the partial function genNeverPatterns. c is a set
of core attack statements, w is a set of without blocks, sd is a set of strand
data, and d a set of definitions. S and K are constants of sort StrandSet
and IntruderKnowledge respectively, which will be treated as variables by the
generated Maude-NPA specification.
From here, it is a simple matter to extract the generated strands and Maude-
NPA states, and wrap them in a Maude-NPA module. This part of the semantics
is implemented in Maude, with some minor syntactic modification, and is used
as the final stage of the translation from a Maude-PSL specification to Maude-
NPA modules.
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Chapter 5
Case Study
In this chapter we do an in-depth analysis of the Otway-Rees protocol [24]. The
Otway-Rees protocol is meant to provide efficient, timely (i.e. no replay attacks
possible) mutual authentication without the explicit use of clocks. Otway-Rees
is interesting because it has a much more complicated term structure than the
Diffie-Helman protocol, and it makes use of more than two principals. As a
result, Otway-Rees allows us to see how the Maude-PSL handles a more com-
plicated protocol. However, the Otway-Rees protocol is still simple enough to
make a thorough study of the specification, translation, and verification of the
protocol a worthwhile endeavor.
Following is the Otway-Rees protocol in Alice-Bob notation. C represents a
conversation identifier generated by Alice. The conversation identifier is meant
to be used as a nonce: a means of marking the conversation to protect against
replay attacks. SKA and SKB are the secret keys of A and B respectively. R1
is Alice’s challenge, a unique value generated by Alice and used by her to ensure
that the session key she receives from the server actually came from the server.
KC represents the session key to be used between A and B.
1. A→ B : C;A;B; e(SKA, RA;C;A;B)
2. B → S : C;A;B; e(SKA, RA;C;A;B); e(SKB , RB ;C;A;B)
3. S → B : C; e(SKA, RA;KC); e(SKB , RB ;KC
4. B → A : C; e(SKA, RA;KC)
5.1 Specification
The first step is to define the language (i.e. operators) we will use to express the
protocol. The bare minimum that we need is a means of representing session-
only values (i.e. nonces), a means of encrypting and decrypting messages with
keys, and a means of concatenating messages. With that in mind, consider the
following Theory section:
Theory
types UName SName Name Key Nonce Masterkey
Sessionkey .
subtypes Masterkey Sessionkey < Key .
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subtypes SName UName < Name < Public .
op n : Name Fresh -> Nonce .
ops a b i : -> UName .
op s : -> SName .
op mkey : Name Name -> Masterkey .
op seskey : Name Name Nonce -> Sessionkey .
op e : Key Msg -> Msg . // encryption
op d : Key Msg -> Msg . // decryption
op _;_ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather (e E)] .
var K : Key .
var Z : Msg .
eq d(K, e(K, Z)) = Z .
eq e(K, d(K, Z)) = Z .
A master key corresponds to the SKA and SKB in the original specification.
This is a key shared by a principal and the server, and only the principal and
server.
Observe that our types are more precisely defined than may be strictly neces-
sary. For example, distinguishing between master and session keys is not strictly
necessary. Indeed, the encryption and decryption equations make no distinction
between master and session keys. However, a more precise type system often
makes Maude-NPA more efficient. Maude-NPA will not waste time exploring
paths in which the protocol uses a master key like a session key. The downside
is that any attacks that rely upon a confusion of types will not be caught. If
the specifier is concerned about attacks that rely on confusing types, then a
weaker type system must be used (at the extreme end, in which we assume no
typing information at all, every term would be of sort Msg). Therefore, it is
recommended a specifier starts with a more precise type system first, and cor-
rect any attacks found with the stronger type system. Then, gradually weaken
the types until either the protocol has been proven secure at all levels of type
sophistication desired, or Maude-NPA fails to terminate.
Next we need to specify the protocol. The terms in the Otway-Rees protocol
are fairly complex, and can be difficult to process. Therefore, we will be making
use of definitions to blackbox some of these terms, and give them a name that
hints at their meanings, as well as matching them up more closely with names
given them in the Alice-Bob notation. As a convention, definition names start
with a lower case letter, in order to distinguish them from variables, which are
(with the exception of variables of sort Fresh, since those are special) in all caps.
Protocol
vars ANAME BNAME : UName .
vars ANAME1 BNAME1 : UName .
var SNAME : SName .
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vars r r’ r’’ rM : Fresh .
vars RA CB CS RB : Nonce .
vars M1 MA : Msg .
var KCA KCB : Sessionkey .
roles A B S .
Def(A) = c := n(ANAME , rM),
ra := n(ANAME , r),
skA := mkey(ANAME , SNAME) .
Def(B) = rb := n(BNAME , r’),
skB := mkey(BNAME , SNAME) .
Def(S) = skA := mkey(ANAME , SNAME),
skB := mkey(BNAME , SNAME),
kc := seskey(ANAME , BNAME ,
n(SNAME , r’’)) .
In(A) = ANAME , BNAME , SNAME .
In(B) = BNAME , SNAME .
In(S) = ANAME , BNAME , SNAME .
1 . A -> B : c ; ANAME ; BNAME ;
e(skA , ra ; c ; ANAME ; BNAME)
|- CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME ; M1 .
2 . B -> S : CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME ;
M1 ;
e(skB , rb ; CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME)
|- CS ; ANAME ; BNAME ;
e(skA , RA ; CS ; ANAME ; BNAME) ;
e(skB , RB ; CS ; ANAME ; BNAME) .
3 . S -> B : CS ; e(skA , RA ; kc) ;
e(skB , RB ; kc)
|- CB ; MA ;
e(skB , rb ; KCB) .
4 . B -> A : CB ; MA
|- c ; e(skA , ra ; KCA) .
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Out(A) = c, ra , KCA .
Recall that our role names are arbitrary, and do not need to conform to the
Alice-Bob convention. The role identifiers used are purely a matter of taste.
To get a feel for how different role identifiers look for a slightly more complex
protocol, consider the following slight modification to the specification above.
Protocol
vars I R : UName .
var S : SName .
vars r r’ r’’ rM : Fresh .
vars RI CR CS RR : Nonce .
vars M1 MI : Msg .
var KCI KCR : Sessionkey .
roles init resp server .
Def(init) = c := n(I, rM),
ri := n(I, r),
ski := mkey(I, S) .
Def(resp) = rr := n(R, r’),
skr := mkey(R, S) .
Def(server) = ski := mkey(I, S),
skr := mkey(R, S),
kc := seskey(I, R, n(S, r’’)) .
In(init) = I, R, S .
In(resp) = R, S .
In(server) = I, R, S .
1 . init -> resp : c ; I ; R ;
e(ski , ri ; c ; I ; R)
|- CB ; I1 ; R ;
M1 .
2 . resp -> server : CB ; I1 ; R ;
M1 ;
e(skB , rr ; CB ; I1 ; R)
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|- CS ; I ; R ;
e(ski , RI ; CS ; I ; R) ;
e(skr , RR ; CS ; I ; R) .
3 . server -> resp : CS ;
e(ski , RI ; kc) ;
e(skr , RR ; kc)
|- CR ;
MI ;
e(skr , rb ; KCR) .
4 . resp -> init : CR ;
MI
|- c ;
e(ski , ri ; KCI) .
Out(init) = c, ri , KCI .
Out(resp) = rr , KCR , MI , M1 , CR .
Out(server) = kc , RI , RR , CS .
The advantage here is that the role identifiers are even more distinct from
the names that each principal associates with each role. However, the meaning
is exactly the same as the original specification.
Recall that the Maude-PSL requires that variables associated with each prin-
cipal be disjoint, with the possible exception of those variables declared as part
of each principal’s input. Similar, only those definitions declared for a specific
principal may be used in that principal’s terms. As a result, we are forced to
use a separate variable CB and CS to represent Bob’s and the server’s perspec-
tives on the conversation identifier c (n(A, rM)). We are also forced to declare
the definition skA and skB twice. While variable sharing does not affect the
semantics of the translation (since Maude-NPA automatically renames the vari-
ables of each strand to make them disjoint), the Maude-PSL requires (mostly)
disjoint variables for two reasons. The first is to emphasize all the possible
cracks in the protocol. For example, the fact that CB becomes CS in the second
step emphasizes that the server does not know for certain that the conversation
identifier it received is the same as the identifier that Bob sent. Second, disjoint
variables increases the chances that we will catch a subtle semantic error arising
from sloppy copy-paste. For example, observe that Bob’s perspective on the
term e(skB, rb ; CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME) is very similar to the server’s per-
spective on the same term e(skB, RB ; CS ; ANAME ; BNAME). Therefore, the
user would be tempted to just copy and paste Bob’s term. However, if the user
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does not properly modify the term to reflect the server’s perspective, then a very
subtle semantic error is introduced into the specification. In particular, if the
server receives the term e(skB, rb ; CS ; ANAME1 ; BNAME), then this sug-
gests that the server should be able to recognize that the nonce it receives was
generated by Bob. However, this is clearly incorrect. As a result, any attacks
that rely on that uncertainty would not be caught, but Maude-NPA would not
complain. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that such a subtle mistake would
be caught solely by eyeballing the terms. However, in this case, the Maude-PSL
will throw an error because a definition rb appears in an S-term, but has not
been declared for use by the server. Therefore, the user becomes aware of this
mistake, and can correct it by replacing rb with RB.
Intruder capabilities are standard. The intruder needs to be able to know
all names, including the server’s name. The intruder should be able to generate
a masterkey between himself/herself and any other principal. Similarly, the
intruder should be able to encrypt/decrypt any message in his/her possession
with any key in his/her possession, and should be able to concatenate messages,
and split apart concatenated messages. This gives us the following intruder
capabilities:
Intruder
vars P : UName .
vars K : Key .
vars N M : Msg .
=> s, P, mkey(i, s) .
M, N <=> M ; N .
K, M => d(K, M), e(K, M) .
P => mkey(P, i) .
Now, for the attacks. We are interested in two attacks: one in which the
intruder learns the session key even though Alice successfully executes the pro-
tocol, and one in which the intruder successfully tricks Alice into thinking she
has executed the protocol with Bob, when in fact Bob has not. In other words,
an attack in which Alice executes the protocol, but Bob does not. However,
to simplify the search as much as possible, we are going to assume that Bob
does receive the first encrypted message that Alice sent. In other words, we
shall instantiate M1 in Bob’s half of the protocol to e(skA, ra ; c ; ANAME ;
BNAME). This is a trade-off between coverage and speed. Instantiating M1 im-
mediately throws out any possible attacks that rely on the intruder replacing
e(skA, ra ; c ; ANAME ; BNAME) with a different term while en route to Bob.
At the same time, Maude-NPA will not bother exploring any paths that rely on
the intruder intercepting e(skA, ra ; c ; ANAME ; BNAME) with something
else, so the search space will be that much smaller.
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Note that we also have a third attack (attack 0) that does not actually check
for any violations of secrecy or authentication. This is an “empty” attack, and
is meant to help the user debug the specification. If attack 0 fails to find an
attack, then there is an error in the specification. This is because attack 0 simply
says that one of the principals executes the protocol. There should always be
at least one way to execute the protocol: a successful execution. Therefore, if
Maude-NPA cannot find a way to successfully execute the protocol, then the
protocol is improperly specified.
Attacks
0 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
1 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
Intruder learns KCA .
2 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
without:
B executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
Subst(B) = M1 |-> e(skA , c ; na ; ANAME ;
BNAME),
ANAME1 |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
Observe that no variables are declared in the Attack section. Recall that
the Attack section uses the same variables as the Protocol section. This ensures
that we do not try to instantiate variables that do not actually appear in the
Protocol section. Furthermore, observe that the second attack gives us an ex-
ample of a non-idempotent substitution after definition expansion:
Subst(B) = M1 |-> e(mkey(ANAME , SNAME), n(ANAME , rM) ;
n(ANAME , r) ; ANAME ; BNAME),
ANAME1 |-> a, BNAME |-> b, SNAME |-> s .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b, SNAME |-> s .
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However the Maude-PSL will automatically generate the idempotent solution
M1 |-> e(mkey(a, s), n(a, rM) ; n(a, r) ; a ; b),
ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b, SNAME |-> s,
ANAME1 |-> a .
during the translation process. Note: If you do not wish to fully instantiate
e(keyAS, c ; ra ; ANAME ; BNAME) (say you do not wish to instantiate the
last two occurrences of ANAME, BNAME), then you need to rename those variables.
For example, we could add the variable declaration vars ANAME1 BNAME1 :
UName to the Protocol section, and then map M1 to e(keyAS, c ; ra ;
ANAME1 ; BNAME1). Then, Maude-PSL will only instantiate those occurrences
of ANAME, BNAME that appear in keyAS, c, ra.
The full specification is as follows:
spec Otway -Rees is
Theory
types UName SName Name Key Nonce Masterkey
Sessionkey .
subtypes Masterkey Sessionkey < Key .
subtypes SName UName < Name < Public .
op n : Name Fresh -> Nonce .
ops a b i : -> UName .
op s : -> SName .
op mkey : Name Name -> Masterkey .
op seskey : Name Name Nonce -> Sessionkey .
op e : Key Msg -> Msg . // encryption
op d : Key Msg -> Msg . // decryption
op _;_ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather (e E)] .
var K : Key .
var Z : Msg .
eq d(K, e(K, Z)) = Z .
eq e(K, d(K, Z)) = Z .
Protocol
vars ANAME BNAME : UName .
vars ANAME1 BNAME1 : UName .
var SNAME : SName .
vars r r’ r’’ rM : Fresh .
vars RA CB CS RB : Nonce .
vars M1 MA : Msg .
var KCA KCB : Sessionkey .
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roles A B S .
Def(A) = c := n(ANAME , rM),
ra := n(ANAME , r),
skA := mkey(ANAME , SNAME) .
Def(B) = rb := n(BNAME , r’),
skB := mkey(BNAME , SNAME) .
Def(S) = skA := mkey(ANAME , SNAME),
skB := mkey(BNAME , SNAME),
kc := seskey(ANAME , BNAME ,
n(SNAME , r’’)) .
In(A) = ANAME , BNAME , SNAME .
In(B) = BNAME , SNAME .
In(S) = ANAME , BNAME , SNAME .
1 . A -> B : c ; ANAME ; BNAME ;
e(skA , ra ; c ; ANAME ; BNAME)
|- CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME ; M1 .
2 . B -> S : CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME ;
M1 ;
e(skB , rb ; CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME)
|- CS ; ANAME ; BNAME ;
e(skA , RA ; CS ; ANAME ; BNAME) ;
e(skB , RB ; CS ; ANAME ; BNAME) .
3 . S -> B : CS ; e(skA , RA ; kc) ;
e(skB , RB ; kc)
|- CB ; MA ;
e(skB , rb ; KCB) .
4 . B -> A : CB ; MA
|- c ; e(skA , ra ; KCA) .
Out(A) = c, ra , KCA .
Out(B) = rb , KCB , MA , M1 , CB .
Out(S) = kc , RA , RB , CS .
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Intruder
vars P : UName .
vars K : Key .
vars N M : Msg .
=> s, P, mkey(i, s) .
M, N <=> M ; N .
K, M => d(K, M), e(K, M) .
P => mkey(P, i) .
Attacks
0 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
1 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
Intruder learns KCA .
2 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
without:
B executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
Subst(B) = M1 |-> e(skA , c ; na ; ANAME ;
BNAME),
ANAME1 |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
ends
5.2 Translation
We have two methods for generating the Maude-NPA file from the above spec-
ification. In the first case, we can invoke the python script directly:
$ ./psl.py directory/to/Otway -Rees.psl
on the command line (assuming our file is named Otway-Rees.psl). This will
generate the Maude-NPA file directory/to/Otway-Rees.maude, but will not
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do anything else with it. Alternatively, we can run the bash script psl.sh:
$ ./psl.sh directory/to/Otway -Rees.psl
This will do the exact same thing as if we invoked the python file directly,
except it will also load the Otway-Rees.maude file directly into Maude-NPA,
allowing the user to immediately begin a Maude-NPA session.
The Maude-PSL generates the following Maude-NPA file. Note that the
generated module has been reformatted for ease of readability. Furthermore
terms of the form X : SortName are inline declarations of variables. In Maude,
inline declarations only have scope within the statement in which they appear.
Inline variable declarations are not allowed in the Maude-PSL, due to subtleties
in the relationship between a single statement in Maude-NPA, and a single
statement in the Maude-PSL that make the semantics of inline declarations in
the Maude-PSL unclear.
fmod PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -SYMBOLS is
protecting DEFINITION -PROTOCOL -RULES .
sorts UName SName Name Key Nonce Masterkey
Sessionkey .
subsorts Masterkey Sessionkey < Key .
subsorts SName UName < Name < Public .
subsorts UName SName Name Key Nonce Masterkey
Sessionkey < Msg .
op n : Name Fresh -> Nonce [ frozen ] .
ops a b i : -> UName .
op s : -> SName .
op mkey : Name Name -> Masterkey [ frozen ] .
op seskey : Name Name Nonce ->
Sessionkey [ frozen ] .
op e : Key Msg -> Msg [ frozen ] .
op d : Key Msg -> Msg [ frozen ] .
op _;_ : Msg Msg ->
Msg [ gather ( e E ) frozen ] .
op _$;_ : Msg Msg ->
Msg [ctor gather(e E) frozen ].
endfm
fmod PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -ALGEBRAIC is
protecting PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -SYMBOLS .
eq d ( K:Key , e ( K:Key , Z:Msg ) ) =
Z:Msg [ variant ] .
eq e ( K:Key , d ( K:Key , Z:Msg ) ) =
Z:Msg [ variant ] .
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endfm
fmod PROTOCOL -SPECIFICATION is
protecting PROTOCOL -EXAMPLE -SYMBOLS .
protecting DEFINITION -PROTOCOL -RULES .
protecting DEFINITION -CONSTRAINTS -INPUT .
eq STRANDS -DOLEVYAO =
:: nil ::
[ nil | +(s), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil | +(P:UName), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil | +(mkey(i, s)), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil | -(M:Msg), -(N:Msg), +(M:Msg ; N:Msg),
nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil | -(P:UName), +(mkey(P:UName , i)), nil]
&
:: nil ::
[ nil | -(K:Key), -(M:Msg),
+(e(K:Key , M:Msg)), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil | -(K:Key), -(M:Msg),
+(d(K:Key , M:Msg)), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil | -(M:Msg ; N:Msg), +(N:Msg), nil] &
:: nil ::
[ nil | -(M:Msg ; N:Msg), +(M:Msg), nil]
[nonexec ].
eq STRANDS -PROTOCOL =
:: r’: Fresh ::
[ nil |
-(CB:Nonce ; ANAME1:UName ; BNAME:UName ;
M1:Msg),
+(CB:Nonce ; ANAME1:UName ; BNAME:UName ;
M1:Msg ;
e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(BNAME:UName , r’: Fresh) ; CB:Nonce ;
ANAME1:UName ; BNAME:UName)),
-(CB:Nonce ; MA:Msg ;
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e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(BNAME:UName , r’: Fresh) ;
KCB:Sessionkey )),
+(CB:Nonce ; MA:Msg), nil] &
:: r’’:Fresh ::
[ nil |
-(CS:Nonce ; ANAME:UName ; BNAME:UName ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RA:Nonce ; CS:Nonce ; ANAME:UName ;
BNAME:UName) ;
e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RB:Nonce ; CS:Nonce ; ANAME:UName ;
BNAME:UName)),
+(CS:Nonce ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RA:Nonce ;
seskey(ANAME:UName , BNAME:UName ,
n(SNAME:SName , r’’:Fresh ))) ;
e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RB:Nonce ;
seskey(ANAME:UName , BNAME:UName ,
n(SNAME:SName , r’’:Fresh )))), nil]
&
:: r:Fresh ,rM:Fresh ::
[ nil |
+(n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ; ANAME:UName ;
BNAME:UName ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(ANAME:UName , r:Fresh) ;
n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ;
ANAME:UName ; BNAME:UName)),
-(n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(ANAME:UName , r:Fresh) ;
KCA:Sessionkey )), nil] [nonexec ].
var LIST : SMsgList -R .
var K : IntruderKnowledge .
var S : StrandSet .
eq ATTACK -STATE (0)=
:: r:Fresh ,rM:Fresh ::
[ nil ,
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+(n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b)),
-(n(a, rM:Fresh) ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
KCA:Sessionkey )) | nil]
|| empty
||
nil
||
nil
||
nil[nonexec ].
eq ATTACK -STATE (1)=
:: r:Fresh ,rM:Fresh ::
[ nil ,
+(n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b)),
-(n(a, rM:Fresh) ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
KCA:Sessionkey )) | nil]
||
KCA:Sessionkey inI
||
nil
||
nil
||
nil[nonexec ].
eq ATTACK -STATE (2)=
:: r:Fresh ,rM:Fresh ::
[ nil ,
+(n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b)),
-(n(a, rM:Fresh) ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
KCA:Sessionkey )) | nil]
|| empty
||
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nil
||
nil
|| never(
(S &
:: r’: Fresh ::
[ nil ,
-(CB:Nonce ; a ; b ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, rM:Fresh) ;
n(a, r:Fresh) ; a ; b)),
+(CB:Nonce ; a ; b ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, rM:Fresh) ;
n(a, r:Fresh) ; a ; b) ;
e(mkey(b, s), n(b, r’: Fresh) ;
CB:Nonce ; a ; b)),
-(CB:Nonce ; MA:Msg ; e(mkey(b, s),
n(b, r’: Fresh) ;
KCB:Sessionkey )),
+(CB:Nonce ; MA:Msg) | nil] )
|| K)[ nonexec ].
endfm
select MAUDE -NPA .
From here, the specifier interacts with Maude-NPA in the exact same manner
as if he/she had written a Maude-NPA file directly. See the Maude-NPA manual
for details [12].
5.3 Maude-PSL vs. Maude-NPA
Now, we will highlight aspects of the two specifications that best illustrate the
improvements the Maude-PSL makes over the strand-based language.
First, consider the specification of the protocol itself. Suppose we are de-
bugging the specification, and we wish to make sure that we have correctly
encoded the perspectives in the first step of the protocol. Determining that in
Maude-PSL is as simple as comparing the two messages in the first step:
1 . A -> B : c ; ANAME ; BNAME ;
e(skA , ra ; c ; ANAME ; BNAME)
|- CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME ;
M1 .
Each subterm has been aligned along the concatenation operator, and the two
perspectives are (vertically) as close as possible. Therefore, comparing the per-
spective is as simple as a few eye flicks, and a bit of thought.
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Now, suppose we wish to compare perspectives using the Maude-NPA style
strands. First, we need to isolate the strand for Alice, and the strand for Bob
from the following strand set:
:: r’: Fresh ::
[ nil |
-(CB:Nonce ; ANAME1:UName ; BNAME:UName ;
M1:Msg),
+(CB:Nonce ; ANAME1:UName ; BNAME:UName ;
M1:Msg ;
e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(BNAME:UName , r’: Fresh) ; CB:Nonce ;
ANAME1:UName ; BNAME:UName)),
-(CB:Nonce ; MA:Msg ;
e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(BNAME:UName , r’: Fresh) ;
KCB:Sessionkey )),
+(CB:Nonce ; MA:Msg), nil] &
:: r’’:Fresh ::
[ nil |
-(CS:Nonce ; ANAME:UName ; BNAME:UName ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RA:Nonce ; CS:Nonce ; ANAME:UName ;
BNAME:UName) ;
e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RB:Nonce ; CS:Nonce ; ANAME:UName ;
BNAME:UName)),
+(CS:Nonce ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RA:Nonce ;
seskey(ANAME:UName , BNAME:UName ,
n(SNAME:SName , r’’:Fresh ))) ;
e(mkey(BNAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
RB:Nonce ;
seskey(ANAME:UName , BNAME:UName ,
n(SNAME:SName , r’’:Fresh )))), nil]
&
:: r:Fresh ,rM:Fresh ::
[ nil |
+(n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ; ANAME:UName ;
BNAME:UName ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(ANAME:UName , r:Fresh) ;
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n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ;
ANAME:UName ; BNAME:UName)),
-(n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(ANAME:UName , r:Fresh) ;
KCA:Sessionkey )), nil] [nonexec ].
If we’re lucky, the person who wrote the specification was kind enough to leave
comments indicating the strands for Alice, Bob, and the server. If we are not so
lucky, then we need to determine which strand is which based on the pattern of
messages. Fortunately, in Otway-Rees isolating Alice’s strand is relatively easy:
it is the strand whose first message is a sent message (i.e. the third strand in the
set of strands above). Then, we need to take that first message, and compare it
against the first messages in the other two strands in order to find the message
that has the same basic structure as Alice’s first message. For terms as complex
as those used in Otway-Rees, this is not trivial. In this case, the first strand
is Bob’s strand. In other words, the two terms we care about are as far away
from each other as they can be! The easiest approach to comparing the terms
now is to copy and paste one of the terms next to the other, and compare them
side-by-side.
Note that the Otway-Rees protocol can be written far more conveniently
than it is above. For one thing, the strands are usually labeled in comments.
For another, since the server and Alice never communicate directly, we can place
Alice’s and Bob’s strand next to each other, and every principal will be next
to every other principal with whom they communicate. However, even in that
case, the first term in Alice’s strand is still separated from the first term in
Bob’s strand by the entiretly of Alice’s strand. Furthermore, there are other
protocols for which the server does communicate with both Alice and Bob. In
that case, there will always be two principals who communicate with each other,
but whose strands are not next to each other.
Now, suppose we are approaching this specification for the first time, and we
wish to how the specification varies (if at all) from the protocol the specification
is ostensibly describing. Or perhaps we are explaining the specification to a
colleague. Either way, we need to be able to look at the specification, and
reverse engineer the high-level description. Suppose we wish to construct the
first step of the protocol. Then, in the Maude-PSL specification, we need only
look at the following statement:
1 . A -> B : c ; ANAME ; BNAME ;
e(skA , ra ; c ; ANAME ; BNAME)
|- CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME ;
M1 .
From here, it is a simple matter of converting the notation used in Maude-
PSL to that used in the Alice-Bob notation. First, we replace ANAME, BNAME,
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ANAME1, BNAME1 with A, and B as appropriate (and obvious). Everything else
simply differs from the high level specification by capitilization, giving us:
1. A→ B : C;A;B; e(SKA, RA;C;A;B)
Obviously, if we want to dig a bit deeper into precisely how Maude-PSL is
representing the challenge (C), or the secret key of A, then we need to investigate
the definitions. However, not only has this allowed us to very quickly reconstruct
the first step, but it has also allowed us to more easily modularize our reverse
engineering:
1. Determine the equivalent Alice-Bob step by converting the Maude-PSL
notation into the standard Alice-Bob notation.
2. Expand the definitions as necessary, depending on how detailed one wishes
to get.
For explaining the step in the protocol to a colleague, one may only need to
convert the Maude-PSL notation into the Alice-Bob notation. For debugging
the specification, or if the colleague asks a particularly subtle question, it may
be necessary to expand definitions. However, that is a mechanical process. Most
of the work involved in understanding the definitions lies in a knowledge of how
the terms and equations are being modeled, not in parsing the specification
itself.
Subsequent steps are slightly more complicated, because one also needs to
instantiate perspectives, which may percolate through multiple steps. For ex-
ample, suppose we now wish to determine the second step. Then, we look at
the second step in the Maude-PSL specification:
2 . B -> S : CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME ;
M1 ;
e(skB , rb ; CB ; ANAME1 ; BNAME)
|- CS ; ANAME ; BNAME ;
e(skA , RA ; CS ; ANAME ; BNAME) ;
e(skB , RB ; CS ; ANAME ; BNAME) .
From the previous step (to say nothing of the variable name), we know that
CB is Bob’s perspective of Alice’s challenge c. So that becomes C. Similarly,
M1 corresponds to the term e(skA, ra ; c ; ANAME ; BNAME). A little bit of
variable renaming gives us the step:
2. B → S : C;A;B; e(SKA, RA;C;A;B); e(SKB , RB ;C;A;B)
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Similarly for the last two steps.
Determining the strand of a principal, P, is equally simple. Simply scan
through the steps, and incrementally add messages. For each step in which P is
sending a message, the message before the turnstile (|-) should show up in P’s
strand as a sent message. For each step in which P is receiving a message, the
message after the turnstile should appear in the strand as a received message.
Now, suppose we wish to construct the same information from the Maude-
NPA specification. First, we need to go through the same process discussed
earlier for isolating the strands that we care about. Then, we need to extract
the two terms we care about:
-(CB:Nonce ; ANAME:UName ; BNAME:UName ;
M1:Msg)
-----------
+(n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ; ANAME:UName ;
BNAME:UName ;
e(mkey(ANAME:UName , SNAME:SName),
n(ANAME:UName , r:Fresh) ;
n(ANAME:UName , rM:Fresh) ;
ANAME:UName ; BNAME:UName ))
Then we need to go through the same process as in Maude-PSL: compare
the two perspectives and from there reconstruct the first high-level step. How-
ever, Maude-NPA does not have any sense of shorthand like the Maude-PSL.
Therefore, we need to be able to recognize that n(ANAME, rM) is the challenge
C, and mkey(ANAME, SName) is Alice’s secret key. In other words, it becomes
much harder with the Maude-NPA specification to control the level of detail
at which you view the protocol. You always see all the details, all the time,
whether you need to see them or not.
Now, suppose we wish to write a simple secrecy attack, in which the intruder
manages to learn the session key that Alice and Bob are attempting to securely
share, despite the fact that Alice successfully executes the protocol. Further-
more, suppose that Alice, Bob, the Server and the Intruder are all distinct
entities. Then, we only need to write the following five lines in the Maude-PSL:
1 .
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = ANAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b,
SNAME |-> s .
Intruder learns KCA .
Similarly, if we wish to understand what the attack is doing, we need to
only read the above four lines. The only part of the attack that is at all subtle
is the the substitution. However, much like the definitions, understanding all
the subtleties may not be necessary, such as when explaining the attack to a
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colleague. So again, the specifier is free to focus on the level of detail that is
necessary for the job at hand.
However, in order to specify the exact same attack in Maude-NPA, we first
need to find, and then copy and paste Alice’s strand into an attack state. Then
we need to manually instantiate the strand, add the intruder knowledge, and
pepper the state with various nil constants to make the state fit the appropriate
syntax. This gives us:
eq ATTACK -STATE (1)=
:: r:Fresh ,rM:Fresh ::
[ nil ,
+(n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
n(a, rM:Fresh) ; a ; b)),
-(n(a, rM:Fresh) ;
e(mkey(a, s), n(a, r:Fresh) ;
KCA:Sessionkey )) | nil]
||
KCA:Sessionkey inI
||
nil
||
nil
||
nil[nonexec ].
First, this construction is very prone to error (i.e. it is very easy for the user
to forget to replace a variable ANAME with the constant a). Second, not only
is there additional information (in the form of the various nil keywords) that
has no bearing whatsoever on the attack, but the attack state does not even
make clear whose strand is being used, and how the strand is being instantiated.
Therefore, if the specifier (or somebody else) approaches the specification later,
and wishes to figure out what the attack is doing, he/she first has to deter-
mine which strand is being used, and then try to determine how it has been
instantiated.
Finally, suppose we have edited the protocol, and now need to update the
attacks to reflect the new protocol. In the case of the Maude-PSL, we only need
to modify the attack state if the variables have been changed, which is unlikely if
the protocol is only being tweaked. Even then, the only change that needs to be
made is to the substitution. However, even the smallest change in the Maude-
NPA specification requires the specifier to go through each attack that uses that
strand (which may not be obvious), and make the exact same small change to
every one of those attack states, while also preserving the intended instantiation.
In short, the Maude-NPA specification, in addition to being harder to read, is
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also much more brittle.
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Chapter 6
Related Works and
Conclusion
6.1 Related Works
ProVerif is one of the most popular protocol verification tools. ProVerif is based
on the typed pi calculus, and as a result protocols are encoded in a variant of
the applied pi calculus [3]. Much like the Maude-PSL, ProVerif allows the user
to specify custom types and function symbols, and allows the user to define a
custom equational theory using rewrite rules. However, ProVerif also requires
the user to explicitly formalize the types of checks that principals perform on
the messages they receive (i.e. verifying digital signatures, extracting keys,
etc.). These checks are implicitly formalized in the Maude-PSL through the
use of perspectives. The notation of the applied pi calculus is quite distant
from the standard Alice and Bob syntax typically used to informally describe
protocols. Furthermore, since the applied pi calculus is a very general logic meant
to model parallel processes, it is also relatively “low-level” for the purposes of
verifying cryptographic protocols. As a result, it can be difficult to write and
read ProVerif specifications, especially if the specifier lacks a deep understanding
of applied pi calculus. On the other hand, a deep understanding of strand spaces
is not necessary to read or write Maude-PSL specifications (though admittedly
it is necessary to understand the attacks generated by Maude-NPA.
The High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) is another major
protocol specification language, this one used by the AVISPA suite of tools [4].
HLPSL is based on Lamport’s Temporal Logic of Actions [16]. HLPSL is similar
to the original Maude-NPA strand-based input language, in that protocols are
specified in terms of each role, rather than in terms of the messages sent and
received. However, HLPSL allows the user more explicit control over the actions
performed by each principal upon receipt of a message. For example, HLPSL al-
lows the user to specify keyrings, and only request a key from a server if said key
is not already in the principal’s keyring. In other words the Maude-PSL requires
the user to work at a much higher level of abstraction than HLPSL necessarily
requires. For example, the Maude-PSL would abstract away keyrings by either
assuming that the principals already know everyone else’s public keys, or by
specifying the keys as input). However, HLSPL shares some of the same down-
sides as Maude-NPA: specifically the role-based specification makes it difficult
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to extract the universal sequence of message passes that serve as the intuitive
formulation of protocols. The notation is also, like ProVerif, quite different from
how protocol designers usually describe and think about protocols.
The Casper language, like the Maude-PSL, mixes a global specification of the
protocol with role-specific information [18]. Both also allow for the specification
of some algebraic properties (such as the commutativity of a given operator). In
addition, the method of specifying the guarantees to be checked is very similar.
For example, in Casper, the user claims that if the protocol is secure, then a
given term will remain a secret after a successful run of the protocol. In the
Maude-PSL the user claims that if a given term does not remain a secret after
a successful run, then the protocol is not secure.
However, in Casper, in addition to specifying the sender and receiver view-
point of a message, the specifier can also define tests that a principal performs
upon receipt of a message. If these tests fail, then the user aborts the run. The
Maude-PSL does not support such tests, though in many cases the information
that would be gleaned are implicitly encoded in the points of view. Furthermore,
Casper has separate syntax for each attack type, while in the Maude-PSL the
attacks are defined using different combinations of more primitive statements.
This provides the Maude-PSL greater flexibility in defining attacks, and reduces
the syntax that needs to be learned. Also the Maude-PSL provides much greater
flexibility in defining the term structure of the messages in the protocol.
The CAPSL language, developed at the Standford Research Institute, can
be thought of as the spiritual ancestor of the Maude-PSL [20]. Some features,
such as the Definitions, were inspired by similar features in CAPSL. Like the
Maude-PSL, the CAPSL language attempts to surround an Alice and Bob spec-
ification with additional information that can then be translated into a given
tool’s potentially less intuitive input language. Furthermore, the basic structure
of Maude-PSL specifications share many similarities to specifications in CAPSL.
However, typically the only role-specific information provided in CAPSL are a
list of assumptions. For example, in CAPSL, one may assume that Alice knows
the name (Bob) of the principal he/she would like to communicate with. CAPSL
specifications may also specify perspective, though it is not required like it is in
the Maude-PSL. Furthermore, CAPSL was meant as a lingua franca between
many different tools, much like HLPSL, while the Maude-PSL was designed ex-
plicitly for the Maude-NPA. As a result, CAPSL does not not have a natural
means of handling the built-in axioms (i.e. commutativity and associativity)
supported by Maude. Furthermore, CAPSL only supports user-defined pre-
fix symbols, whereas the Maude-PSL supports more flexible mixfix operators,
allowing the Maude-PSL specifications to more closely match the specifier’s pre-
ferred syntax. Furthermore, the Maude-PSL and CAPSL differ in terms of how
they specify the guarantees to verified. CAPSL takes a positive approach: the
user specifies the goals directly. For example, SECRET K asserts that the key
K must be kept secret. Meanwhile, the Maude-PSL takes a negative approach:
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the user specifies an attack pattern that, if successful, violates the goal. For ex-
ample, an attack in which Alice executes the protocol, and the intruder learns
the key K. Finally, the Maude-PSL allows the user to customize the capabilities
of the Intruder in the Intruder section.
6.2 Future Work
As it stands, the Maude-PSL supports almost all the features of Maude-NPA.
The only feature that the Maude-PSL currently lacks is support for protocol
composition. Therefore, the next step is to implement protocol composition.
After implementing protocol composition, the Maude-PSL will be able to ex-
press all types of protocol specifications that Maude-NPA currently supports. A
means of importing sections (such as Theory and Intruder sections) would also
be very valuable. For example, if a user wishes to use a theory of XOR, or a
theory of asymmetric cryptography, then the user should be able to just import
the requisite equational theories, rather than repeatedly rolling their own. In
addition to saving the user time, this will also standardize specifications to some
extent (since all specifications that import theories will have a core of shared
syntax), and it will also drastically increase the chances that the user’s equa-
tional theories meets all the assumptions made by Maude-NPA. Furthermore,
if the user is importing one or more pre-defined theories, then the user should
also be able to import the associated intruder capabilities. This would allow
the user to focus on what is important: the protocol and attacks.
Maude-NPA makes a large number of assumptions about the equational
theory provided [12]. Some of them, particularly termination and confluence,
are non-trivial to verify, and therefore often are not. However, these properties
are absolutely essential if we want the output of Maude-NPA to make any sense.
Fortunately, tools have already been developed for checking if an equational
theory written in Maude is terminating and confluent: the Maude Termination
Tool and Church-Rosser Checker respectively [10, 11]. Therefore, in order to
ensure that our proofs are not “built on sand” so to speak, the translation should
include an option to perform heavy checks. When this option is activated, then
in addition to performing the standard syntactic and simple semantic checks, the
Maude-PSL translator would also automatically invoke the Maude Termination
Tool and Church Rosser-Checker on the equational theory. If the checks succeed,
then the specification is translated like normal. If the checks fail, then the
output of the tool is displayed to the user, and the translation process aborted.
Then, the user may make the necessary changes, and attempt to translate the
theory again, just like any other translation error. Of course, these checks are
undecidable in general, and they may take non-trivial amount of time, so they
should not be required in order to perform a successful translation. However, if
all it takes to perform the checks is a flag on the command line, then the user
is much more likely to perform the checks at least once.
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Currently when Maude-NPA finds an attack, the attack is printed as a
Maude-NPA state. Therefore, the attack as printed is displayed in a man-
ner quite distant from the message passing notation typically used to express
attacks. As a result, in order to understand the output of the tool, the user does
still need to understand the structure of a Maude-NPA state, which includes a
set of strands. Therefore, a means of automatically translating Maude-NPA
states into a message passing notation similar to that used by the Maude-PSL
would drastically improve the usability of the tool, because it would allow the
user to work at the same level both for the input and the output. Alternatively
(or in addition) there is a graphical user interface built by Santiago and Talcott
to visualize attacks (and the state space in general) of a Maude-NPA specifica-
tion [27]. Integrating the Maude-PSL with this interface would greatly enhance
the usability of Maude-NPA.
6.3 Conclusion
The specification of cryptographic protocols is a careful balancing act. On one
end, we have the classic Alice and Bob notation. This notation is intuitive, clear,
and expressive. However it is also relatively informal, and sacrifices precision
simplicity and readability. On the other hand, we have notation like that used
by Maude-NPA: a very precise notation that provides all the information needed
by a computer to perform automatic reasoning, but at the cost of simplicity,
and readability. Furthermore, the original Maude-NPA input language has a
slew of other weaknesses, chief among them a variety of syntactic artifacts that
are required by Maude, but don’t contribute to the meaning of the specification,
and a tremendous amount of code repetition.
In an effort to fix some of these issues, and to bring these two extremes
closer together, we have in this document proposed a new input language for
Maude-NPA: the Maude Protocol Specification Language (Maude-PSL). The
Maude-PSL begins with the Alice and Bob notation, and extends it slightly to
provide additional information. It also provides a means, through the Theory
and Intruder sections to make explicit information usually ignored by the stan-
dard Alice and Bob notation: the algebraic properties of the operations used in
the protocol, and the capabilities of the intruder. All of this information is en-
coded in a concise notation that minimizes repetition and improves readability.
Finally, attacks are specified in a combination of mathematical notation and
natural language that makes it possible to describe attacks succinctly, clearly
and in a manner that makes them resilient to changes in the protocol. Further-
more, the Maude-PSL performs a variety of syntactic and semantic checks that
endeavor to minimize the chances of the user committing subtle errors that are
all but impossible to detect. The Maude-PSL also opens the door for a deeper
integration of Maude-NPA with other tools developed to aid Maude develop-
ers, such as the Maude Termination Tool, and the Church-Rosser Checker. We
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believe that the Maude-PSL will highlight subtleties in protocols before verifi-
cation even begins, simplify the specification, communication, and verification
of said protocols, and increase user confidence of the results of said verification.
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Appendix: Formal Syntax
Here we provide a BNF specification of the Maude-PSL syntax. Note that this
BNF grammar is necessarily incomplete: the full grammar of a specification
cannot be known until the user has defined all custom operators. We use the
non-terminal 〈term〉 to represent terms built using the user-defined operators.
Meanwhile, 〈id〉 refers to sequences of characters that do not contain whitespace.
Finally, the nonterminal 〈nat〉 refers to natural numbers, and 〈string〉 refers to
any string. Furthermore, spaces in the grammar represent actual spaces.
Note that although the 〈spec〉 rule generates the 〈theory〉, 〈protocol〉,
〈intruder〉, and 〈attack〉 sections in a specific order, they can in fact appear in
any order. However they all must appear exactly once. Similarly with the core
attack statements.
〈spec〉 ::= ‘spec’ 〈id〉 ‘is’ 〈theory〉 〈protocol〉 〈intruder〉 〈attacks〉 ‘ends’
〈theory〉 ::= ‘Theory’ 〈theoryStmts〉
〈theoryStmts〉 ::= 〈theoryStmt〉 ‘.’
| 〈theoryStmt〉 ‘.’ 〈theoryStmts〉
〈theoryStmt〉 ::= 〈typeStmt〉
| 〈subtypeStmt〉
| 〈opStmt〉
| 〈varStmt〉
| 〈eqStmt〉
〈typeStmt〉 ::= ‘type’ 〈ids〉
| ‘types’ 〈ids〉
| ‘sort’ 〈ids〉
| ‘sorts’ 〈ids〉
〈ids〉 ::= 〈id〉
| 〈id〉 〈ids〉
〈subtypeStmt〉 ::= ‘subtype’ 〈ids〉 ‘<’ 〈subtypes〉
| ‘subtypes’ 〈ids〉 ‘<’ 〈subtypes〉
| ‘subsort’ 〈ids〉 ‘<’ 〈subtypes〉
| ‘subsorts’ 〈ids〉 ‘<’ 〈subtypes〉
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〈subtypes〉 ::= 〈ids〉
| 〈ids〉 ‘<’ 〈subtypes〉
〈opStmt〉 ::= ‘op’ 〈idsUscore〉 ‘:’ 〈ids〉 ‘->’ 〈id〉
| ‘ops’ 〈idsUscore〉 ‘:’ 〈ids〉 ‘->’ 〈id〉
| ‘op’ 〈idsUscore〉 ‘:’ 〈ids〉 ‘->’ 〈id〉 ‘[’ 〈opattrs〉 ‘]’
| ‘ops’ 〈idsUscore〉 ‘:’ 〈ids〉 ‘->’ 〈id〉 ‘[’ 〈opattrs〉 ‘]’
〈idsUscore〉 ::= 〈id〉
| ‘_’
| 〈id〉 〈idsUscore〉
| 〈id〉‘_’ 〈idsUscore〉
| ‘_’〈idsUscore〉
〈opattrs〉 ::= 〈opattr〉
| 〈opattr〉 〈opattrs〉
〈opattr〉 ::= ‘comm’
| ‘assoc’
| ‘id:’ 〈term〉
| ‘iter’
| ‘gather(e E)’
| ‘gather(E e)’
〈varStmt〉 ::= ‘var’ 〈ids〉 ‘:’ 〈id〉
| ‘vars’ 〈ids〉 ‘:’ 〈id〉
〈eqStmt〉 ::= ‘eq’ 〈term〉 ‘=’ 〈term〉
| ‘eq’ 〈term〉 ‘=’ 〈term〉 ‘[’ 〈eqAttrs〉 ‘]’
〈eqAttrs〉 ::= 〈eqAttr〉
| 〈eqAttr〉 〈eqAttrs〉
〈eqAttr〉 ::= ‘variant’ | ‘metadata’ 〈string〉 | ‘homomorphism’
〈protocol〉 ::= ‘Protocol’ 〈protocolStmts〉
〈protocolStmts〉 ::= 〈protocolStmt〉 ‘.’
| 〈protocolStmt〉 ‘.’ 〈protocolStmts〉
〈protocolStmt〉 ::= 〈varStmt〉
| 〈roleStmt〉
| 〈inStmt〉
| 〈defStmt〉
| 〈stepStmt〉
| 〈outStmt〉
〈roleStmt〉 ::= ‘roles’ 〈ids〉
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〈inStmt〉 ::= ‘In(’〈id〉‘) =’ 〈idList〉
〈idList〉 ::= 〈id〉
| 〈id〉‘,’ 〈idList〉
〈defStmt〉 ::= ‘Def(’〈id〉‘) =’ 〈defPairs〉
〈defPairs〉 ::= 〈defPair〉
| 〈defPair〉, 〈defPairs〉
〈defPair〉 ::= 〈id〉 ‘:=’ 〈term〉
〈stepStmt〉 ::= 〈int〉 ‘.’ 〈id〉 ‘->’ 〈id〉 ‘:’ 〈term〉 ‘|-’ 〈term〉
〈outStmt〉 ::= ‘Out(’〈id〉‘) =’ 〈termList〉
〈termList〉 ::= 〈term〉
| 〈term〉‘,’ 〈termList〉
〈intruder〉 ::= ‘Intruder’ 〈intruderStmts〉
〈intruderStmts〉 ::= 〈intruderStmt〉 ‘.’
| 〈intruderStmt〉 ‘.’ 〈intruderStmts〉
〈intruderStmt〉 ::= 〈varStmt〉
| 〈capabilitiesStmt〉
〈capabilitiesStmt〉 ::= ‘=>’ 〈termList〉
| 〈termList〉 ‘=>’ 〈termList〉
| 〈termList〉 ‘<=>’ 〈termList〉
〈attack〉 ::= ‘Attacks’ 〈attackPatterns〉
〈attackPatterns〉 ::= 〈attackPattern〉
| 〈attackPattern〉 〈attackPatterns〉
〈attackPattern〉 ::= 〈int〉 ‘.’ 〈coreAttack〉
| 〈int〉 ‘.’ 〈coreAttack〉 〈withoutBlocks〉
| 〈int〉 ‘.’ 〈coreAttack〉 〈reduction〉
| 〈int〉 ‘.’ 〈coreAttack〉 〈withoutBlocks〉 〈reduction〉
〈coreAttack〉 ::= 〈executions〉 ‘.’ 〈learns〉 ‘.’ 〈constraints〉
| 〈executions〉
| 〈executions〉 〈learns〉
| 〈executions〉 ‘.’ 〈constraints〉
〈executions〉 ::= 〈execution〉 ‘.’
| 〈execution〉 ‘.’ 〈executions〉
〈execution〉 ::= 〈executes〉 ‘.’ 〈subst〉
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〈executes〉 ::= 〈id〉 ‘executes protocol’
| 〈id〉 ‘executes up to’ 〈nat〉
〈subst〉 ::= ‘Subst(’ 〈id〉 ‘) =’ 〈substMappings〉
〈substMappings〉 ::= 〈substMapping〉
| 〈substMapping〉‘,’ 〈substMappings〉
〈substMapping〉 ::= 〈id〉 ‘|->’ 〈term〉
〈learns〉 ::= ‘Intruder learns’ 〈termList〉
〈constraints〉 ::= ‘With constraints’ 〈neqList〉
〈neqList〉 ::= 〈neq〉
| 〈neq〉, 〈neqList〉
〈neq〉 ::= 〈id〉 ‘!=’ 〈term〉
〈withoutBlocks〉 ::= 〈withoutBlock〉
| 〈withoutBlock〉 〈withoutBlock〉
〈withoutBlock〉 ::= ‘without:’ 〈executions〉
〈reduction〉 ::= ‘state-space-reduction:’ 〈avoidBlocks〉
〈avoidBlocks〉 ::= 〈avoidBlock〉 ‘.’
| 〈avoidBlock〉 〈avoidBlocks〉
〈avoidBlock〉 ::= ‘avoid:’ 〈coreAttack〉
88
